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1 Introduction 
The BRIC story is the story about how an acronym, coined to describe the club of rising 
economic powers, turned into a political reality. The Western global economist Jim 
O’Neill created the concept in 2001, uniting Brazil, Russia, India and China. In his 
analysis, “Building Better Economic BRICs”, O’Neill identified the BRIC countries as the 
new emerging global economies. O’Neill projected that the four countries’ economies 
together would grow larger than the G6 (i.e. the G7 without Canada) by 2040. Already, 
BRICs are exceeding this initial forecast (O’Neill and Stupnytska 2009).  
Their rapidly growing economies were the hallmark that made O’Neill think of the four 
countries as one group. China, for instance, being the BRIC with the fastest growing 
economy, had an increase of 3 trillion GDP dollars from 2003 to 2009. “It’s the 
equivalent of China having created two United Kingdoms in seven years” (Jim O’Neill 
2009a). Thus, it was predominantly their common economic features that were the 
reasons for why O’Neill united them under one acronym. Eight years after the term’s 
naissance, however, the BRIC countries convened their first joint summit in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia, making the term into a political reality as well. Out of the Summit 
came a cross-continental political institution and a joint declaration stating, inter alia, 
their common vision on global governance, international economic and financial issues, 
international trade, development and commitment to joint cooperation. In their              
2nd Summit, they BRICs stated that: 
We reaffirm our commitment to advance cooperation among BRIC countries in 
science, culture and sport” (II BRIC Summit – Joint Statement 2010:7) 
It is this statement that encourages my thesis. It forces the question of why four 
politically, geographically and, last but certainly not least; culturally different countries 
wish to advance cooperation within these fields. In order to acquire an in-depth 
understanding of the motivation behind this statement, I have limited the thesis to focus 
on the cultural part of the statement. My research therefore sets out to study how the 
statement of reaffirmed commitment to advance cooperation on culture manifests itself 
in the World’s only global intergovernmental organization with a mandate on culture, 
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namely the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
and its World Heritage Committee.  
My research question reads as follows; 
How and to what extent does the BRICs’ joint statement of culture cooperation manifest 
itself in UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee? 
1.1 Building BRICs  
Needless to say, the BRICs are as culturally distinct as they are geographically divided. 
They share no common language or history, and even their respective forms of central 
governance differ, varying from democracy to one-party states. The four countries 
never, at least publicly, conceived of themselves as one unit. The BRIC countries 
bilaterally and trilaterally, however, have been and are still linked through various 
accords between the capitals. Examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO), which was established as a border security strategy between, inter alia, Russia 
and China, but serves also as a means to strengthen the geopolitical position of the East 
and uphold the multipolar world order (Tsygankov 2006:149). Moreover, the SCO 
served as regional joint attempt to find solutions to international and regional problems, 
and to promote regional economic and cultural cooperation (Lukin 2007:1). Other 
Cross-continental collaboration agreements are found in the tripartite IBSA group 
uniting India, Brazil and South Africa. IBSA seeks to invigorate South-South cooperation, 
as well as enhance cooperation on a wide range of hard- as well as soft policy issues 
(Manmohan Singh, 2010). Other bilateral agreements between the BRIC members 
include the “strategic partnership” that since 2005 has formalized the diplomatic 
relation between China and India, aiming to settle the long-lasting Himalayan border 
dispute, and to boost economic and trade cooperation (Huanxin 2005:1). 
What this shows is that the BRIC countries have been connected through various 
agreements across their national borders. Nevertheless, the motivations behind the 
establishment of cross-continental and cross-cultural BRIC cooperation are still unclear. 
Finding the common denominators that unite this group therefore requires extensive 
examination. Some shared attributes are the structural features that they had in 
common at the time of their naissance: large populations, underdeveloped economies 
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and governments that appeared willing to embrace some of the elements of 
globalisation. Another aspect was their position at the time of the 9/11-terror attack.  
Among other things, what the attack represented was strong resentment towards the US 
and Western-led globalisation process. The attack was a powerful demonstration that 
the non-Western world was starting to matter more and more. And the BRIC         
countries – being increasingly important actors in the globalization process – were, 
together with the rest of the world, reminded of the power domination of the West, and 
that the power distribution in the world order was somewhat unfair (Tett 2010). 
Moreover, the expansion of the G8 to G20 also signalled the increased economic position 
of developing countries (Keohane and Underdal 2011:60). As Jim O’Neill suggests, the 
BRICs and the rest of the world became aware of the weakened position of the US and 
the role that they could play in the future globalization process. “In the back of 9/11, the 
message was; if the world is going to thrive, globalisation cannot be Americanisation” 
(Jim O’Neill 2010c)  
The recent inclusion of South Africa into the acronym, making the BRICs into BRICS, 
further complicates the hunt for the common denominator of the group. Moreover, it 
indicates their ambitions and potential vigorousness. As South Africa joined the club of 
rising powers after the time of data collection, this thesis is concerned with the BRICs 
without the capital S.  
1.2 Towards “BRICanisation”?  
There are many and varying speculations as to why the BRICs have come to formalise 
their cooperation. Equally varying are the projected trajectories for the BRICs’ role and 
future position in the international order. Scholars belonging to the realist school of 
international relations would argue that the BRICs use their power to overthrow the 
existing world order and seek vengeance for the decade-long dominance of the US and 
the West in the international system. John Ikenberry’s (1980) description of the US’ 
exercise of hegemonic power during the post-war years, suggest that this has evoked 
hostilities and desires to reduce the US’ enjoyment of the unipolar power structure. 
Other, less dramatic projections suggest that the BRICs seek to adapt to the existing 
international order (Glosny 2010) and that they have no ambitions to avenge US 
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dominance. The BRIC trajectory is yet to be formulated, but looking at certain aspects 
that the BRICs have in common may go some way in mapping out possible paths. 
Collectively, the four countries make up 40 per cent of the World’s population. Their 
annual GDP in 2009 ranks the BRIC countries at respectively 8th, 12th, 10th and 3rd on the 
list of the World’s largest economies (World Bank, 2009). Their individual military 
capacity, for instance, accounts to an annual sum of respectively 33.5, 58.6, 41.2 and 
119.4 billion US dollars for each of the BRICs (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 2010) giving them a collective strategic strength that certainly challenges the 
dominance of the US that characterized the last decade.  
“It’s the world turned upside-down. The US is certainly not going to be anywhere near 
its dominance in the next coming decades” (Jim O’Neill 2010b) As O’Neill argues, the 
geopolitical paradigm is changing. With the BRICs’ increasing economic power, comes 
their demand for an international position that reflects their capacities on the global 
arena. This is clearly demanded in their Joint Declaration of 2009. 
We are committed to advance the reform of international financial institutions, so 
as to reflect changes in the world economy. The emerging and developing 
economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial 
institutions. (I BRIC summit – Joint Declaration 2009:1) 
The 2009 financial crisis further proved the economic power of the BRICs. While the    
US – long serving as the global economic backbone – was heavily hit by the crisis, the 
BRIC countries, especially China, survived the crisis without severe injuries. Rather, 
BRIC countries such as China and Brazil who once begged the US and Western-defined 
financial institutions for financial support were suddenly the ones feeding into the 
global economic reserves of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This, together with 
their growing economic size, may have reminded the BRIC countries that they were 
worthy of a stronger voice in the global financial institutions like the World Bank and 
the IMF. This may be what motivates them to push for reform of the global financial 
system and to call for the introduction of an alternative currency to the dollar as the 
World’s reserve currency (BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2009, 2010, 2011). 
Projecting the consequences that a shift from the US dollar as reserve currency would 
have on global affairs is beyond the scope of this analysis, but if the BRICs were to utilise 
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their own trade currency amongst themselves, it would undoubtedly weaken the US’ 
global capabilities. What this suggests is that weakening the role of the US may be one of 
the motivations behind BRIC cooperation. Whether or not this is verifiable is yet to be 
seen, but this, together with other policy factors such as the fact that all of the BRIC 
countries practice “territorial denial” against the US1 (Skak 2010, Kraft 2010) support 
this assumption.  
The BRICs are also demanding their voices be heard in global non-financial institutions. 
In the UN for instance, Russia and China, holding permanent membership to the UN 
Security Council, call for a stronger representation of the current Council members 
Brazil and India in the UN system (BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
This, together with China and Russia’s veto against the American intervention in Iraq 
and the collective BRIC countries’ recent abstention from the UN vote on military action 
in Libya, may indicate that the group strive to gain political clout on the international 
arena. If these assumptions are correct, one could assume that the BRICs seek to shift 
the geopolitical axis east- and southwards and to rectify the imbalance between the 
West and the “Rest” that for long has prevailed in the international order (Underdal & 
Keohane 2011, Barma et. al 2009) The following quote from the Joint Declaration of 
2010 illustrates their explicit endeavour of developing a multipolar world order in 
which international law, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of non-
interference in domestic affairs prevails: 
We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, 
based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated 
action and collective decision-making of all States (II BRIC Summit – Joint 
Declaration, 2010:1). 
1.3 Building BRICs in UNESCO 
The Joint Declarations from the BRIC Summits proves the widespread assumption that 
BRIC countries endeavour to sustain the role and importance of the UN in the 
international arena. The UN and other global intergovernmental organizations have 
never been as influential on world politics as they are today (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004:1). They define global, nationally transcendent problems and initiate action (Boli 
                                                        
1
 Territorial denial entails refusing any US’ military activity within their respective borders. 
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and Thomas 1999 a, b; Finnemore 1996; Meyer et.al 1997). Relying on these premises, 
possessing the power to influence and control the dynamics and outcomes of 
international organization, is a valuable source of power in international relations. 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:894ff, Nye 1990, see also section 7.3) 
If you look at these [intergovernmental] organisations, they are all remnants of 
World War II. The main benefit that I observe of them [the BRICs] meeting and 
pronouncing together, is that it should embarrass the US and the G7 members, and 
the heads of the IMF and the other “true” global organisations. (…) To get a move-
on with making our global organisations more representative. (Jim O’Neill 2010b) 
Whether the BRICs’ motivations are what Jim O’Neill portrays above remains to be 
examined. There is little doubt, however, that the BRICs seek to enhance their position 
within the world’s international organisations. Strengthening their position within 
UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee (also referred to as the Committee) may be 
a clever step towards increased influence in the international society. This is because 
UNESCO, as a “soft issue” organization with a mandate on culture, may serve as an arena 
to promote national culture and -supremacy. Moreover, the World Heritage Committee 
holds weak sanctuary capacity, but influence state behaviour and encourages 
compliance through standard setting instruments and normative discourses (Turtinen 
2006:13).  The normative approach that UNESCO takes on is illustrated in the 
Organisation’s working methods: 
UNESCO works to create the conditions for dialogue among civilizations, cultures 
and peoples, based upon respect for commonly shared values. It is through this 
dialogue that the world can achieve global visions of sustainable development 
encompassing observance of human rights, mutual respect and the alleviation of 
poverty, all of which are at the heart of UNESCO’S mission and activities. (UNESCO 
2001) 
Thus, through conventions, recommendations, declarations and resolutions as well as a 
normative discourse, international organisations contribute to defining problems and 
shaping states’ interests, perceptions and reactions toward certain problems (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004:3). This is highly pertinent characteristics of the World Heritage 
Convention, which makes it an influential tool in the international arena. Moreover, 
UNESCO’s slogan reflects the cognitive influence that the organisation aims to exercise:  
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Since wars began in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of 
peace must be constructed.  
The World Heritage Committee represents an arena for discussing preservation and 
conservation of the world’s cultural and natural heritage, but it also serves as an arena 
where ideas are developed and constructed, and where ideological and cultural 
influence may affect states and their perceptions of problems, practices and the social 
reality (Turtinen 2006:14). Relying on the premises of Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998:903) who claim that emergence and establishment of norms have a significant 
influence on state behaviour in international organisations, one can assume that much 
political power lies within the construction of norms. Therefore, being a norm 
entrepreneur in a norm generating organization such as UNESCO may be a potent 
political strategy that the BRICs seek to endorse. Thus, the power to influence the 
“minds of men” might be what encourages the BRICs to enhance cooperation on culture.  
1.4 The political side of the World Heritage Emblem 
As argued above, the World Heritage Committee may contribute to norm diffusion and 
to shaping and defining ideas. The World Heritage Convention also encapsulates 
material assets through its economic, social and environmental potential, which brings 
in a political dimension into the World Heritage Convention. World Heritage as a brand 
is becoming increasingly recognised and the designation represents a “powerfully 
evocative symbol” (Jason and Sari 2010:534). Having a property enlisted almost 
exclusively produces revenues through increased tourism, investments and 
employment. (Bandarin, Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz 2011:4ff)  However, depending 
on the management and organisational structures associated with the World Heritage 
Site, the listing of a site (also referred to as property) can generate vast benefits from 
activities associated with it. If managed incorrectly, however, the designation may cause 
severe damage to the site and to stakeholders involved. This, one has seen examples of 
in, for instance, Machu Picchu. 
Bandarin, Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz (2011) have identified how culture generates 
development, first and foremost with reference to the economic revenues that World 
Heritage status produces, but in addition to these, they address how World Heritage 
status generates social spin-offs through crafts, music and other cultural and creative 
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products at and around World Heritage Sites. Through good management practices, 
capacity building and training connected to World Heritage Sites, social conditions, 
awareness and education levels may also improve (Scottish Natural Heritage 
Commissioned Report 2007:2). The management of the Saint Sebastian Fortress Site in 
Mozambique serves as a valuable example in this regard. The restoration of a historical 
cistern at the World Heritage Site did not only employ approximately 100 locally 
recruited workers, but also resulted in bringing clean water to the local community. 
Moreover, these activities generated large-scale crafts development, bringing in 
revenues local stakeholders. What this shows is the economic and socio-economic 
potential that lies within the World Heritage Convention, which the BRICs and other 
state parties strive to tap out. 
World Heritage status may further generate intangible spin-offs such as increased self-
esteem and national identity. The Convention highly recognizes the respect and need for 
cultural identity and enlisting of properties may strengthen sentiments of pride and 
local and national affiliation. As addressed by the classic social science-theorists such as 
Stein Rokkan (1987), these are important elements for acquiring national stability, and 
are effective tools in the process of state- and nation building. Thus, World Heritage may 
be an essential tool for national governments in their efforts in upholding territorial 
integrity and stability. 
The democratic effect of World Heritage Status should also be mentioned in this regard. 
As cultural heritage encapsulates sentiments of pride, identity and resilience, it may 
prompt empowerment of communities, resulting in broader participation in national 
and global contexts, facilitating dialogue and fostering social cohesion (Bandarin, 
Hosagrahar and Sailer Albernaz 2011: 6ff). Moreover, the international recognition and 
prestige that is associated with the World Heritage status makes the emblem a valuable 
tool for states parties in their efforts to gain visibility and strengthen the position in the 
international community.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This introduction has presented some of the incentives that may motivate the BRICs to 
articulate their cooperation in the area of culture. It suggested that BRIC cooperation is 
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motivated by their rising economic powers and the wish to rectify West’s power 
dominance. I have also suggested that this is not at all the case, and highlighted the 
economic and socio-political interests that the World Heritage emblem encapsulates.    
As little is previously written about the BRICs, this thesis takes on a highly explorative 
approach when I try to answer how and to what extent the BRICs’ statement on culture 
cooperation manifest itself in UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. I have set out a 
study which is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides the necessary empirical 
background of UNESCO and the World Heritage Convention, its Committee and the 
bureaucratic processes and institutional framework. Chapter 3 outlines and discusses 
the research design, which triangulates between three different methods. Theoretical 
perspectives on coalition formation and multilateral negotiations are presented in 
Chapter 4, developing the analytical framework for the thesis. Having established and 
discussed the methodological challenges and theoretical expectations, Chapter 5 sets out 
to statistically test whether the assumption presented here, that of BRIC cooperation 
motivated by a wish to diminish American and Western cultural hegemony, finds 
empirical support. The conclusions from Chapter 5 establish the point of departure for 
the next part of the thesis. This is explored in Chapter 6, in which the findings of the 
statistical analysis are examined further through qualitative research strategies. Chapter 
7 uses the theoretical framework to discuss the findings from Chapter 5 and 6 and, 
before summarising and landing on a conclusion in Chapter 8.  
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2 The World Heritage Convention – 
framework and bureaucracy  
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation is, through the 
integration of the World Heritage Convention, the only intergovernmental organisation 
with a global mandate on culture. The cultural mandate of UNESCO is assured by The 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
commonly known as the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter referred to as the 
Convention), which came into being when it was adopted by UNESCO’s General 
Conference at its 17th session in Paris, 1972. 
The World Heritage Convention is commonly referred to as UNESCO’s flagship, and the 
Convention in itself is claimed to be the world’s most significant heritage conservation 
agreement for preservation of the World’s cultural and natural heritage (Cameron & 
Rössler (pre-printed paper 2011:2)2 The Convention states that; “parts of the world’s 
heritage are of outstanding interest and need to be preserved as part of the world 
heritage of mankind as a whole” (Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972:preface) 
2.1 The Outstanding Universal Value of World 
Heritage sites 
There are currently 911 World Heritage Sites (also referred to as properties) spread 
across 151 countries represented on the World Heritage List. The List is amended 
annually when state parties of the Convention, holding membership in the World 
Heritage Committee, come together and create a “fictive moral and political community” 
in which humanity and the world are perceived as one unit (Turtinen 2006:53). This 
entails that when sites are inscribed on the World Heritage List, it is removed from its 
national context and placed in a global context in which its value becomes universal for 
all humanity. It is this idea – that of universality and the world as one unit – which make 
                                                        
2 The Convention is currently (by 2011) ratified by 187 of today’s 193  recognised states within the United 
Nations system 
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up the key framework of World Heritage, namely that each World Heritage site must be 
of Outstanding Universal Value (OUV). The concept of OUV is what makes properties 
qualify for inscription on the World Heritage List, and is defined by the Convention text 
as follows;  
Outstanding universal value means cultural and/or natural significance, which is so 
exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance 
for present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent 
protection of this heritage is of the highest importance to the international 
community as a whole. The Committee defines the criteria for the inscription of 
properties on the World Heritage List.3 (Operational Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 2005: para. 49) 
Cultural heritage of OUV refers to history, art or science in the case of “monuments” and 
“groups of buildings”, and to historical aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points 
of view in the case of “sites”. Natural heritage of OUV would apply to natural 
features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, 
or areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of 
outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation. (The 
World Heritage Convention 1972: art. 1 and 2) 
2.1.1 Organisational structure 
Identifying and defining World Heritage is an extensive process involving a set of 
defined procedures, routines, concepts, criteria and actors with various tasks. All 
elements in the process are regulated by the Convention and its rules of procedures, 
which are encapsulated in the Convention’s implementation tool; Operational Guidelines 
for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (hereinafter referred to as the 
Operational Guidelines (OG)). The OG describes the rules of procedure for inscription, 
the procedure for protection and conservation of World Heritage Sites, the roles and 
responsibilities regarding granting of international assistance as well as mobilisation of 
international support to the Convention.  
                                                        
3 A site must fulfill certain criteria of authenticity and integrity in order to qualify for World Heritage 
status. See UNESCO’s Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention for 
description of the criteria for inscription. (WHC. 05/2 2 February 2005 paragraph 77 (i-x)) 
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The World Heritage Committee holds the responsibility to establish, publish and keep up 
to date the World Heritage List. (The World Heritage Convention 1972: art. 7) The 
Committee is elected by UNESCO’s General Conference and makes decisions that are to 
be based on objective and scientific considerations. Thus, the Committee is (intended to 
be) a politically neutral expert committee, which today consists of 21 members, 
represented by state parties elected by UNESCO’s General Conference. A Committee 
member's term of office is for six years, but according to customs, most State parties 
choose voluntarily to be Members of the Committee for only four years. Within the 
period in which the data for this study is collected the BRICs have held Committee 
membership for the following terms: Brazil 2007 – 2011; Russia 2001 – 2005 and 2009 
– 2013; India 2001 – 2007; China 1999 – 2005 and 2007 – 2011.  
Seven of the 21 Committee members make up the World Heritage Bureau, which 
prepares the World Heritage Committee’s work and drafts the decisions that the 
Committee discusses during the meeting.  
The decisions of inscriptions made by the Committee are made on the basis of Expert 
Bodies’ (here referred to as Advisory Bodies (AB)) technical and scientific assessment of 
the sites’ OUV. The ABs present their recommended decision for each nomination 
directly to the Committee (before 2005 the ABs presented and elaborated their 
recommendations to the Bureau before presenting them to the Committee), which since 
2005 has resulted in a broader, and potentially more political and less scientific 
discussion during the Committee meeting, according to Jokilehto (2011:3). Jokilehto’s 
assumption is an essential point which is subject to extensive discussion and 
examination in the later parts of the thesis.  
The central administrative function is upheld by the Convention’s Paris-based 
Secretariat; the World Heritage Centre, which in addition to implementing the decisions 
of the Committee4, also organises Committee meetings, upholds correspondence with 
state parties and the ABs, controls economic affairs, as well as holds responsibility to 
spread information- and knowledge about the Convention.  
                                                        
4 Except decisions of inscriptions. State parties are responsible for the implementation of the Convention 
and the protection and conservation of the enlisted sites.   
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The table below illustrates the structure of the inscription processes for getting a 
nomination inscribed on the World Heritage List. Only state parties can submit 
nominations on behalf of themselves. It is during the World Heritage Committee 
sessions that the discussions take place and where the Committee must be persuaded of 
a nominated site’s OUV, and as I later will show, this is where political conflicts are 
latent.  
Table 2. The Inscription Process5  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 based on Turtinen’s illustration 2006:59 
State Parties 
submit nominations 
of national sites that 
they expect to be of 
Outstanding 
Universal Value 
Unesco World 
Heritage 
Centre 
controls that the 
nomination dossiers 
are complete 
Evaluation 
phase  
Advisory Bodies 
assess the value of  
the nominated site. 
Submit their 
recomendations to 
the Committee 
The World 
Heritage Bureau  
makes draft decisions 
based on the 
recommendations 
from the ABs 
Decisional 
phase  
The World Heritage 
Committee makes 
decision of 
inscription to the List 
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3 Methodological Framework 
There are no bullet-proof research designs (David Collier 19956)  
The purpose of this Chapter is to present the methodological framework designed to 
collect and process the data needed to answer the question of how and to what extent 
BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the World Heritage Convention. Moreover, the 
Chapter aims to outline and discuss the methodological choices made, in an attempt to 
make the research design as bullet proof as possible. For inductive studies such as this, 
where the outcomes of the research methods often are unpredictable and where 
surprising findings often lead to unanticipated methodological turns, designing an 
adequate methodological framework is an exacting task. Thus, being explicit about the 
grounds on which the research strategic choices are made is, as King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994:8) emphasise, crucial for enabling others to discuss and criticise the 
research design, and for assessing the reliability and validity of the data collected. The 
following pages are therefore dedicated to outline the methodological exercise and 
argue how the framework developed here will answer the research question.  
3.1 Studying BRICs in the World Heritage 
Committee  
The comprehensive study of the BRICs in the World Heritage Committee is a study of 
how and to what extent BRIC cooperation is designed and operationalized in the 
universe of intergovernmental organisations. The overarching research design 
embedded in this thesis is a case study design. Case studies are generally associated with 
qualitative research strategies and are suitable for small N-, in-depth analyses (Gerring 
2007:18, George and Bennet 2005:17). A case study may be understood as “the intensive 
study of a single case where the purpose of that study – at least in part – is to shed light 
on a larger set of cases” (Gerring 2007:20). Although often associated with qualitative 
methods, there is no rigid universal methodology recipe for case studies. The strategy 
used for this study triangulates between quantitative analyses and qualitative 
                                                        
6 As quoted in R. Doorenspleet and E. Mastenbroek (2008:2) 
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interviews. This is a somewhat unconventional case study recipe, but no less a good 
strategy that will collect the data needed for answering the research question.  
The complexity of the BRIC phenomenon is the main reason behind the choice of a 
multi-strategy research design. The newness of the phenomenon reduces the extent to 
which existing literature is of aid, and further calls for an exploring research approach to 
the phenomenon. Furthermore, obtaining insight into the intricate context surrounding 
the BRICs necessitates multiple research methods, as one method alone cannot grasp 
the complexity of the processes and the organisational contexts in which the BRICs act. 
The mix between qualitative and quantitative methods will by no means provide perfect 
insight into the phenomenon, but it enhances the understanding of the political reality 
(Doorenspleet & Mastenbroek 2007:18). Nevertheless it enables me to reap off the 
benefits of each method while at the same time limiting their weaknesses, which 
contributes to enhancing the reliability and validity of the inferences of the study. The 
statistical method’s strength in detecting tendencies and falsifying theoretical 
assumptions (George & Bennet 2007:18), is highly valuable for this study. These benefits 
serve a valuable purpose for this analysis, as is detects information about the BRIC 
phenomenon that determines the next, qualitative step of the analysis, which allows me 
to study the tendencies more in-depth and illuminate eventual unforeseen correlations. 
3.2 Collecting and applying quantitative data  
The statistical analyses conducted in this study serve two functions. The first is to 
examine the existence of what I call a “Western bias” in the World Heritage Committee. 
Second, is to establish a point of departure for the qualitative analysis. The quantitative 
analyses detect tendencies and interesting findings that the qualitative analysis sets out 
to examine in-depth.   
The data collected for the statistical analysis consists of nominations submitted to the 
Committee between 2002 -2010. Here, I have created a dataset based on the 
nominations submitted to the Committee. I have coded the variables according to the 
nominations’ respective decisions, country/region origin, time of submission, 
recommendation by the ABs, BRIC/not BRIC, and whether the nomination’s decision 
aligns with the ABs’ recommendation. N = 328 and the nominations make up the units in 
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the dataset.  I have limited the scope of the quantitative analysis to only entail decisions 
regarding inscription of sites, and not other decisions that the Committee makes. The 
timeframe from 2002 – 2010 is based on the BRICs’ history, and is limited to the year 
before the BRIC concept became internationally known7. I found it appropriate to gather 
data from before the term’s (international) naissance and up until today, in order to 
detect eventual temporal changes before and after BRICs’ naissance. All units fulfil 
information on all variables, thus there are no missing values. Moreover, the sample of 
units equals the universe, making the role of the standard deviation estimate of limited 
substantial value as the data fully reflect the social reality. As the dependent variable in 
all analyses is dichotomous, binary logistic analyses are conducted.  
All decisions are publically available on UNESCO World Heritage Centre’s website and 
have been downloaded from there (see literature list) and coded into the variables used 
in the analysis. In Chapter 5 I discuss and operationalize the variables. 
3.3 Collecting and applying qualitative data 
 
As the analysis will show, the multi-strategic research design allows me to explore the 
tendency detected in the quantitative analysis further. Moreover, it allows me to look for 
support for the proposed assumptions as well as other explanations behind the BRIC 
cooperation.  
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Two methods stand out as adequate strategies for answering the research question: 
document analysis and qualitative interviews. Minutes from the Committee meetings 
would have provided valuable insight into the BRIC phenomenon. Because the written 
reports from the last two8 World Heritage Committee sessions are inaccessible per the 
time of research, the document analysis consists of decisions from the 34th Session as 
                                                        
7 The concept was invented in 2001, but received full attention with O’Neill’s Report of 2003 “Dreaming 
with BRICs: the path to 2040” 
8 The last two Sessions from 2009 and 2010 are the ones of interest because these found place after the 
formalisation of the cooperation.  
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well as a White Paper from the Norwegian and Swedish Governments9, reflecting the 
34th Committee Meeting in Brasilia, 2010. The latter method, qualitative interviews, 
comes in many forms. Semi-structured interviews serve as a middle ground between 
unstructured interviews  - best suited as a source of insight into a phenomenon, and 
structured interviews with closed-ended questions – suited for hypothesis-testing, but 
without flexibility to provide detailed and nuanced information about the subject 
(Bryman 2004, Andersen 2006:279). Semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions capture the benefits of both methods, and may thus provide details, depth, the 
insider-perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing (Leech 
2002:665).  
“The best interviewer is not the one who writes the best questions. Rather, excellent 
interviewers are excellent conversationalists” (Berry 2002:679). As Berry’s argument 
underscores, semi-structured interview is a dynamic process between the researcher 
and the informant. The unstructured, open-ended features of this method is highly 
pertinent for this study. For research on complex phenomena such as this, where 
informal meetings, diplomatic relations, cognitive influences and personality factors 
may play a significant role in the negotiation dynamics and –outcomes (Hampson 
1995:15), the interview situation may enable met acquire extensive knowledge about 
the phenomenon and detect unanticipated mechanisms and correlations. By leading the 
conversation into areas in which I desire more insight and by asking follow-up 
questions, I can get deeper into the empirical material. The informants may thus provide 
me with unique in-depth and nuanced information that neither quantitative analyses, 
nor literature or written records would grasp. That the researcher takes an active role 
does not, however, mean that the researcher should dominate or override the 
conversation. (Andersen 2006:287).  
The open dynamics and the lack of structure that characterise this method may contest 
the reliability and objectivity of the information acquired. In order to enhance reliability 
and maximise the benefits of the interview method, Andersen (2006:287) suggests that 
the researcher be active in a way that enables her/him to balance between an open 
                                                        
9 Sweden holds membership to the Committee and has provided me with the Swedish Report from the 
World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia, 2010 
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conversation and hypothesis testing during the interview. This exercise requires a well-
prepared interviewer that possesses knowledge, and holds expectations of what will be 
said and found during the interview. Exactly how prepared the researcher ought to be is 
disputed among scholars, as some claim that too much knowledge may lead to prejudice 
and bias the data (Andersen 2006:286), whereas others recommend that the researcher 
“play dumb” in order to acquire as extensive information possible (Leech 2002:665). I 
will use elements of both tactics in order to maximise the benefits of each.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Whatever interview-tactic used, an interview guide may balance and structure the 
interview. In developing the guide, the question order and the manner in which the 
questions are asked should be considered thoroughly, as they may influence and bias the 
response (Leech 2002:666, Bryman 2004:110) and jeopardize reliability and validity of 
the data. In order to detect why and how the BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the 
World Heritage Committee Meeting, the interview guide is deliberately developed in a 
way that leaves out the term BRIC in the first part of the interview, enabling me to play 
“dumb” as Leech (2002:665) recommends. This is a measure taken in order to increase 
reliability and validity as it avoids setting any guidelines for what the respondent should 
feel is important to mention. Using an interview strategy such as this is not to be 
understood as an attempt to confuse or mislead the informants, but rather a way to 
reduce the risk of biasing the data. 
3.4 Considerations regarding reliability and validity 
“All inference – in quantitative and in qualitative research – is uncertain” (King, Keohane 
& Verba 1994:31). Presenting and discussing my research design in this Chapter, is an 
effort to increase the certainty of the inferences from this research. Keeping in mind, 
however, that no research designs are bulletproof as expressed by Collier (1995), this 
section sets out to discuss some the threats towards this study’s reliability and validity.  
While the quantitative analyses provide precise quantitative estimates for reporting of 
errors and certainty, there are no exact estimates of the certainty of my conclusions 
from the qualitative interviews. The lack of standardisation in the qualitative data 
collection process therefore constitutes the greatest threat towards reliability and 
validity of this thesis. Moreover, the subjectivity in the interviewees’ answers as well as 
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my own subjectivity is a possible source of bias that is difficult to avoid when conducting 
semi-structured interviews. The measures taken in order to reduce the risk of bias, has 
been to not mention the BRICs in the beginning of the interview, and to include 
politically neutral observers into the arsenal of informants. Andersen (2006:283 - 285), 
however, has an interesting point with regards to qualitative methods and subjectivity. 
He argues that qualitative interviews may enhance reliability and validity, as the 
dynamic interview situation enables the interviewer to understand the relation between 
subjectivity and the social reality much better, than do quantitative methods. This 
reduces bias in the data. Andersen’s argument is valuable here, as the interview 
situation allowed me to get an impression of the informants’ perception of BRIC 
cooperation.  Another obstacle to reliable and valid data, is the fact that one of the BRICs 
are missing among my informants, and, moreover, the overarching possibility that 
bilateral agreements among the BRICs are falsely interpreted as representative of the 
BRIC as a group.  
With regards to the quantitative analysis, it is the small N of 328 that constitutes the 
greatest threat to reliability, and increases the likelihood of making type 2 errors, which 
is to falsely accept the null-hypothesis. Triangulating between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is a strategy reduces the risk of doing type 2 errors, and enhances 
the confidence of the inferences made from this analysis. It should be emphasises that 
the multi-strategic research design significantly enhances the confidence of my 
inferences and produces data that with certainty may be considered reliable.  
Having presented my research strategy developed for collecting and applying the data 
for this analysis, the next Chapter sets out to present the theoretical framework 
developed for the analysis.  
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4 Theoretical perspectives 
The purpose of this chapter is to present theoretical perspectives that relate to the 
research question of why and to what extent the BRICs statement of cooperation on 
culture manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee. Moreover, it develops an 
adequate theoretical framework which will serve as a reference point in the analysis of 
BRIC behaviour in the World Heritage Committee. The newness of the phenomenon, and 
the complexity of the setting in which the BRICs operate, calls for the use of multiple 
theoretical approaches.  I here make use of three theoretical perspectives. The first, 
coalition theories suggest when coalitions occur and what they seek to achieve. As these 
are developed for parliamentary negotiation settings, they do not fully apply to 
multilateral negotiations. For this reason I look towards Joseph Nye’s Soft Power theory 
in order to complement the coalition theories’ suggestions of what may encourage 
coalition formation. Having established a theoretical framework for understanding why 
coalitions emergence, I confer approaches within negotiation theory, as these propose 
how the negotiation setting influences state behaviour and coalition formation.  
4.1 Coalition theories  
Coalitions are unique features of multilateral negotiations. They serve different 
functions, have different objectives and roles and use different strategies in various 
negotiation settings. Coalition is here defined after Wagner’s concept (1988) and 
understood as “the unification of power or resources (or both) of two or more parties so 
that they stand a better chance of obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others 
not included in the coalition” (Wagner 1988:461-481 as quoted in Ulrichsen 2002:24). 
What outcomes coalitions desire to obtain, however, is subject to discussion 
subsequently. Within the existing literature on coalition theory, one may distinguish 
between two different “groups”, depending on their perceptions of when and why 
coalitions occur (Underdal and Midgaard 1977:340). “Apolitical” coalition theories of 
Riker (1962) make up the first group, while the second group constitutes “policy 
distance” theories of Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan (1973). 
22 
 
4.1.1 Apolitical coalition theories 
The apolitical coalition theories view the negotiation setting as a static situation in 
which actors are sole and rational entities, who seek to maximise net benefit. According 
to Riker (1962), the sole purpose of coalition formation is coalition success, which is 
defined as winning the majority of a decision-making body. Winning the majority is 
further expected to increase the actors’ net gains. What the coalition wins is presumed 
to be a fixed pot, which the coalition members share. In order to keep the dispersal of the 
pot as minimal as possible, coalitions will entail no surplus members than those needed 
to win the majority (Riker 1962:32-46). Riker’s theory, however, presupposes that the 
negotiated issue has a dichotomous outcome, i.e. that the actors either win or lose, and 
that “the winner takes it all” (Underdal and Midgaard 1977:340).  
Riker’s definition of coalition success is too narrow to sufficiently explain the BRICs in 
the World Heritage context. There are several reasons for this. First, Riker’s theory is 
developed within the context of parliamentary decision-making bodies, and not within 
international negotiation contexts where the decision rules often are based on 
consensus and not majority rule. Second, in multilateral negotiations, there may well be 
other benefits of joining a coalition than the shared payoffs among the winning coalition 
members. Third, the perception of negotiation outcomes as dichotomous, does not 
match coalition formation in consensus-based multilateral organisations, where neither 
negotiation success nor coalition success are easily categorised as a win or lose. 
4.1.2 Policy distance theories 
The policy distance theory of Axelrod (1979) and De Swaan (1973) is also developed 
within parliamentary decision-making bodies, but as they operate with different 
presuppositions of coalition formation, it applies to the multilateral negotiation context. 
The basic notion of Axelrod and De Swaan’s policy distance-theory is that actors strive 
to be included in a winning coalition that they expect to adopt a policy which is as close 
as possible to their own most preferred policy (De Swaan 1973:88). Success of a 
coalition is still operationalized in terms of winning or losing the majority of the 
decision-making body, but the policy-distance theory suggests that actors assess the 
value of a coalition according to the proximity of the coalition’s expected policy to their 
own political preferences. The value of a coalition is hence contingent upon the political 
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distance10 between the coalition members’ political preferences. This means, the degree 
to which the coalition members gather around a common political goal (De Swaan 
1973:88). All coalitions do not have the same likelihood of forming, as the political 
distance between the negotiating actors will affect coalition formation. 
The policy distance theory further differs from that of Riker, as it does not presume that 
there is a fixed pot to be shared among the coalition members. Therefore, coalitions will 
not necessarily strive to stay minimal, as Riker presupposes, but may well include 
unnecessary members. They may even include all actors in a decision making body (De 
Swaan 1973:88). This is because the value of a coalition is defined as the sum of the 
policy distance between the members, and not as the distribution of the pot of limited 
material goods. Nevertheless, it is likely that the smaller the policy distance the larger 
the gains.   
4.1.3 Common aversions and blocking coalitions 
Keeping the idea of some sort of common political preference in mind, the policy 
distance theory opens up for another approach to understanding coalition formation, 
namely coalitions emerging as a result – not of proximate political preferences – but of 
common political aversion. The coalition members may not have a uniform perception 
of what policy should be executed, but may be united through a unanimous perception 
of what policy should not be executed.  
Unlike dilemmas of common interests, in which the actors have a common interest 
in insuring a particular outcome, the actors caught in the dilemma of common 
aversions have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome (A. Stein 
1982:309). 
Stein’s assumption is supported by Hampson’s argument that opposing interests, 
manifested through blocking coalitions may act to prevent agreement on or 
implementation of a treaty (Hampson 1995:30). Blocking coalitions are often comprised 
by states that possess enough structural power that their refusal to arrive at a solution 
will be sufficient to prevent the settlement of an agreement (Hampson 1995:30). Stein’s 
and Hampson’s idea of coalition formation as a result of common political aversion is 
                                                        
10 Policy distance is defined in terms of weights (votes) and policy positions of the actors (De Swaan 
1973:88) 
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therefore relevant for this study, as the thesis already has suggested  that the BRICs are 
united through a common resentment towards the US’ dominance of the international 
order. Moreover, given the BRICs vast differences in all aspects, it seems easier to unite 
around a common aversion rather than a common political preference.  
4.2 Objectives of coalition formation 
The coalition theories presented hitherto presuppose that winning the majority of the 
decision-making body or securing a particular negotiation outcome is the purpose of 
coalition formation. As the negotiation outcomes of the World Heritage Committee, i.e. 
inscriptions to the World Heritage List, cannot be put into a fixed pot, nor easily be 
measured in terms of policy distance, securing a particular negotiation outcome may not 
be of primary concern for the World Heritage Committee members. The negotiation 
process, however, may encapsulate political incentives and interests. As UNESCO and the 
Committee represents an organisation where “soft issues” are debated and where 
culture and norms may be spread, there may be potent political goods embedded in the 
negotiation setting. Considering the fact that the World Heritage Committee works 
under consensus, further feeds into this assumption. 
Conferring Joseph Nye’s Soft Power theory gives reason to devote attention to the 
negotiation process as a political arena. Nye argues that traditional “hard power” i.e. 
command power defined by military resources, are to an increasing extent being 
replaced by what he calls co-optive “soft power”. Nye defines this as the “ability to make 
others want what you want” (1980:166) and can further be understood as “the ability to 
shape the preferences of others” (Keohane and Underdal 2011:53). Nye argues that soft 
power assets, such as ideological power, media power, persuasion-power, and the 
power to shape and decide the international agenda are becoming increasingly 
important in the international society. This suggests that states interact with the aim to 
exercise and enhance their soft power resources when acting in the World Heritage 
Committee Multilateral negotiations generally, and the World Heritage Committee 
specially, may be an ideal arena to communicate and strengthen these assets. If further 
understanding soft power as the ability to influence and define the norms of 
international society, and if relying on the premises of Finnemore and Sikkink 
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(1998:894ff) who address the power of norm-entrepreneurs11, holding soft power 
capabilities may be a significant source of power to influence international dynamics, 
and hence something that the BRICs strive to achieve.   
4.3 Negotiation theory 
The idea that the negotiation process itself may generate payoffs finds support in the 
process analysis approach to negotiation. This approach is less concerned with 
rationality and concerns about a particular outcome as a determinant of state behaviour 
and negotiation outcomes, as do the traditional theories of explaining multilateral 
negotiations (Hampson 1995:15). The process analysis approach holds that the broader 
environmental context surrounding the negotiation process affects state behaviour and 
negotiation outcomes. Moreover, that situational pressures, cognitive influences, 
personality factors and interaction factors influence the actors involved in negotiations 
(Hampson 1995:15). Most essential, however, is that the process analysis approach 
treats multilateral negotiations as a process and holds that negotiation outcomes and 
emerging coalitions are results of a “sequence of connected events” rather than 
something fixed and static, as Riker suggests.  Further, the process-oriented approach 
treats negotiation as an integrative process where the creation of new norms and values, 
as well as evolution of trust and reciprocity, is considered valuable payoffs of the 
negotiation process.  
As multilateral negotiations typically go through different phases, one may assume that 
these also influence coalition formation. Equally, one may assume that the presence of 
coalitions during the different negotiation phases give and indication of the “depth” of 
the coalitions. During the first phase of negotiations, the pre-negotiation phase, is the 
phase were where one or more parties consider their behavioural options prior to the 
formal negotiations (Hampson 1995:25). Finding evidence of BRIC cooperation in this 
phase may therefore indicate that the BRICs coordinate their efforts and that the 
cooperation is solidly manifested in the Committee. The second phase, the negotiation 
phase, is the phase in which the formal negotiations take place and where coalitions are 
                                                        
11 Finnemore and Sikkink argue that defining and developing norms is a significant source of power and of 
influence in the dynamics in international organisation. (1998:894ff) 
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formed. One may thus assume that coalitions that emerge during this phase may just as 
well be a result of randomly coinciding positions among actors as of planned and 
coordinated actions.  
The three phases of negotiation and their content can be illustrated as follows12:  
Table 4.3 Phases of Negotiation13  
 
4.3.1 External and internal negotiation groups 
During the different phases of negotiation various groups emerge (Ulrichsen 2002:18).  
Buzan (1980) distinguishes between informal external and –internal groups present in 
multilateral negotiations. What distinguishes these groups is the motivation behind their 
formation, their function within the negotiations, and their temporal perspective 
(Ulrichsen 2002:18). External groups have a general purpose and hold a long-term 
perspective. These groups often emerge and exist outside of the negotiation forum and 
are established on the basis of geographical, political or cultural commonalities. They 
have as primary priority to uphold its longstanding structures and to promote a 
common policy line. This is reflected by the fact that these groups often are coordinated 
                                                        
12
 The third phase of negotiations is when parties reach a preliminary settlement and seek to translate 
these into concrete actions (Hampson 1995:28). This phase is of less relevance for the study of coalition 
formation, and is therefore not elaborated upon here. 
13 As illustrated in Hampson 1995:26 
•Problem identification 
•Search for options 
•Commitment to negotiate 
•Agreement to negotiate 
1 Prenegotiation 
•Agenda debate 
•Search for principles 
•Issue definition 
•Bargaining concessions 
•Details of agreement  
2 Negotiation 
•Mutual Commitments 
•Accommodation 
•Verification and compliance 
•Implementation  
3 Agreement 
and 
Implementation 
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and receive instructions from their home governments. Internal groups contrast the 
external groups in the sense that these are largely ad-hoc groups that emerge within the 
context of a specific negotiation forum or issue-discussion. They tend to emerge as a 
reaction to conflicting interests, and evolve and dissolve with the discussions of the 
issues at stake. Buzan further divides this group into separate categories, of which the 
common interest groups is relevant to this case.   
Common interest groups are made up by states with some shared geographical, 
functional or policy-attribute and with some common views on the implication of this 
attribute (Ulrichsen 2002:19). This group is closely related to Axelrod and De Swaan’s 
policy distance-coalitions, as common interest groups enable coalition formation and 
mutual support between states with similar preferences. The groups are flexible in the 
sense that they can easily dissolve in the case of “bad fit” (i.e. that the coalition members 
don’t arrive at a common platform) and are not limited by structures embedded in 
groups with long term perspectives. Their purpose is simply to advance or to defend a 
particular policy (Ulrichsen 2002:19). Buzan’s categorization of negotiation groups is a 
valuable point of reference for the analysis of the BRICs behaviour, as finding an 
adequate label will signal the depth of the cooperation and thus indicate the extent to 
which BRIC cooperation is manifested in the Committee.  
4.3.2 Summary 
This Chapter has presented theoretical perspectives of when and why coalitions emerge 
in multilateral negotiations. The coalition theories provide valuable suggestions for 
when BRIC coalition will form in the World Heritage Committee and to what extent it is 
manifested. From these theories, I can expect that the BRICs will form a coalition if they 
share a preferred negotiation outcome, and if they expect that they by acting together 
will achieve this objective, as suggest the coalition theories. Joseph Nye’s Soft Power 
Theory and Finnemore and Sikkink’s demonstration of power through norm-
entrepreneurship, this Chapter further suggests that the negotiation process 
encapsulates interests that motivate the BRICs. Negotiation theory suggests likewise, 
and holds that formation of a BRIC coalition it something that happens through a 
sequence of connected events, in which the environmental context surrounding 
negotiations is important.  Analysing the BRICs with reference to Buzan’s negotiation 
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groups that occupy the different phases of negotiation will indicate the political 
anchoring of the BRICs and the degree to which their cooperation is manifested in the 
Committee.  
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5 The West and the Rest  
Having established the analytical framework, this chapter sets out to examine whether 
there exists a political divide between the West and the Rest in the World Heritage 
Committee, by which BRIC cooperation may be motivated. Identifying this is decisive for 
the next course of the analysis.  
The majority of UNESCO’s 911 World Heritage Sites are situated in the Western part of 
the world (UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Per 31 December 2010). The unequal 
dispersal of Sites may well raise questions about the credibility of the World Heritage 
List, as well as the process of inscribing nominations to it (Jokilehto 2011:2ff). Equally, 
the imbalanced World Heritage List may reflect a disproportional power structure of the 
international order that dates back to the post World War II era, and to a Western-
shaped multilateral order that for decades have favoured the West and hindered the 
“Rest”14 (Jim O’Neil 2010, Ikenberry 1989, Keohane & Underdal 2011: 1-2). This Chapter 
sets out to examine whether the unequal number of inscriptions of Western 
nominations to the World Heritage List is the result of a political bias within the 
institutional framework of the World Heritage Convention, in favour of the West. If this 
proves to be the case, rectifying the imbalanced List could be a possible motivation 
behind the BRIC’s statement of cooperation on culture. The result of this analysis 
therefore determines the next step of the analysis and serves as point of departure for 
the qualitative approach.  
5.1 Looking for a Western Bias   
Throughout the decade that followed the post-war years, the US enjoyed a hegemonic 
position with extensive economic and military resources. The position allowed the US to 
lay down much of the premises for the formation of the international order (Ikenberry 
1989:115, Keohane & Underdal 2011:1-2), including the United Nations (UN). Relying 
on the premises of the realist approach to international relations i.e., that institutions 
                                                        
14 I here operate with three different categories of countries. The West is defined within the traditional 
geographical boundaries, incorporating the USA and the Western European countries. The Rest is defined 
and operationalized in two turns: one based on a geographical definition and a second definition is made 
along a political dimension. This is thoroughly discussed subsequently.  
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are shaped by state interests and power, one can assume that the Western UN-
entrepreneurs made sure that the institutional framework of the organisation was 
developed in line with Western norms and interests. What this suggests is that the UN, 
at the time of its establishment, was biased in favour of the US and the West.  
65 years after the establishment of the UN, almost all of the world’s state parties have 
ratified the UN Charter. As “new” nations entered into the Organisation throughout the 
post-war decades, they implicitly agreed to an institutional and legal framework that 
they were not part in developing- Rather, they became subject to discourses and norms 
that they may have felt, and may still feel, alien to. If translating the well-known theory 
of March and Olsen (2004) to the case of membership to the UN, one could argue that 
the new members become subjects to the Logic of Appropriateness. From this 
perspective, actors who enter into already established political institutions tend to 
become socialised into the formal and informal rules and norms of conduct.  As the new 
actors may be concerned with fulfilling the obligations and expectations encapsulated in 
certain roles, identities or memberships, they tend to adapt to the already existing 
institutional framework, rather than trying to change it. Applied to this case, new state 
parties to UNESCO may be imposed an institutional framework which they do not seek 
to change as they see fit, but rather, that they strive to integrate into, thus securing the 
persistence of the institutional framework. 
If the “new” members to UNESCO do not agree with the rules and norms of conduct that 
the West established, and if they do not possess the power or ability to change them, one 
could well assume the Western-defined norms and interests still remain prominent 
within the institutional framework. Thus, that there may exist a Western bias15 within 
UNESCO, in favour of the West. For the case of the World Heritage Convention, this may 
prove evident if the Committee makes decisions in favour of the West, for example by 
inscribing a higher share of Western nominations on the World Heritage List than 
nominations submitted by other countries.  
                                                        
15
 See definition and operationalization of the term in section 5.1.1 
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Looking towards the distribution of submitted nominations among the regions in table 
5.1, gives alone reason to suppose that there exists a Western bias in the Committee.  
The table shows that almost 45 per cent of all nominations submitted to the Committee 
from 2002 – 2010 come from the West. The disproportional extent of submitted 
nominations may have several explanations, but following the reasoning outlined here, 
one may well assume that a bias facilitates inscription of Western nominations. Proving 
the existence of a Western bias, will feed into the assumption that BRIC cooperation is 
motivated by a wish to rectify the imbalance and to compensate for the long lasting 
Western dominance in the international order. Put in John Ikenberry’s (1989) terms; 
that BRIC cooperation is motivated by a wish to undermine Western cultural hegemony.   
Table 5.1 Nominations submitted to the World Heritage Committee 
 
Table 5.1 shows the share of submitted nomination by region, from 2002 – 2010. 
5.1.1 Western bias 
I expect that a Western bias exists if nominations submitted by the West are more likely 
to be inscribed on the List than nominations submitted by non-Western countries. 
Moreover, that the Western nominations are more likely to be recommended for 
inscription by the ABs, than are non-Western nominations (the role of the ABs and their 
recommendations is elaborated upon further in section 5.3) Western bias is thus 
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operationalized as likelihood for having a nomination inscribed, and likelihood for 
having a nomination recommended for inscription. In order to detect a Western bias, 
this Chapter sets out to analyse two phases of the inscription process; the decisional 
phase (the negotiation phase in the Committee) and the evaluation phase, i.e. the 
process where the ABs assess the OUV of the nominations. 
The analysis that follows is many-fold; the first part probes the probability of inscription 
between the West and the Rest. Here, the effect of two different definitions of the West 
and the Rest are tried out. First, the analysis examines the effect of a geographically 
operationalized region-variable on the likelihood of inscription. As the effect proves 
insignificant, the operationalization of region is expanded to also entail a political 
dimension. As none of these variables show significant effects on the dependent variable 
“Inscription”, the study proceeds to look for a Western bias deeper within the 
inscription process: in the evaluation phase. In this part, the analysis brakes up the 
dichotomous categorisation of the West and the Rest in order to provide a more 
thorough and nuanced picture of where in the inscription process the Western bias may 
be found.  
5.2 The West, the Rest and the probability of having 
a nomination inscribed 
The dichotomous dependent variable, “Decision to inscribe/not inscribe”, calls for a 
binary logistic analysis. This is because logistic analyses allow one to see the linear effect 
of a variable despite the constraints that follow dichotomous variables with upper and 
lower value limits (Skog 2009:351-397). The two-fold operationalization of the region 
variable is done in an effort to detect whether the lack of significant results is caused by 
inadequate operationalization of region. Moreover, it is done in order to identify 
whether the effect of region changes with the inclusion of a political dimension into the 
West-Rest definition.  
5.2.1 The effect of geographical region on inscription 
The first analysis examines the difference in likelihood for inscription between 
nominations submitted by the West and the Rest when the two groups are defined 
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geographically. The definition is made on the basis of UNESCO’s six electoral groups16. 
With minor modifications from this categorisation, the groups are defined as follows: 
Group I: EU member states pry 2010 and North American States17 
Group II: Eastern (non-EU members) and Central European States18 
Group III: Latin-American and Caribbean States 
Group IV: Asian and Pacific States 
Group V:  African States 
Group VI: Arab States 
Group I make up the West, all other groups are included in the Rest. 19 
Table 5.2.1 Effect of the geographical West on likelihood of inscription 
 B (S.E.) b Significance Odds ratio 
Intercept b0  
Decision to inscribe 
nomination/ not inscribe 
.869 .165 .000 2.385 
X1 
The geographical West 
.146 .273 .593 1.157 
N 328 
The dependent variable “inscription” holds value 1=decision to inscribe, and value 
0=decision not to inscribe.  
Independent variable, X1; “The geographical West” holds value 1=the West and 0=the Rest,  
 
Interpreting results of logistic analyses 
A binary logistic analysis makes it possible to see a linear effect between the 
variables, through a recoding of the values on the dependent variable to log its, 
expressed through odds and log odds, which indicate the increase or decrease in 
the odds of value 1 occurring on the dependent variable with increasing values on 
the independent variable. As the recoding of the values on the variables makes the 
interpretation of the results of a logistic analysis far from intuitive, the effect 
indicated through odds ratio is valuable tool facilitating the interpretation of the 
results. Odds ratio >1 indicates that the odds increase with increasing values on the 
independent variable. Odds ratio <1 indicate that the odds that value 1 occurs on 
the dependent variable decrease with increasing values on the independent 
variable. Odds ratio = 1 shows no effect on dependent variable. 
                                                        
16 Electoral groups are a regional categorisation of state parties. 
17 The choice of including Eastern European EU member states that granted EU membership after the 
2004-enlargement to Group I, is grounded in the notion that these states to a high degree fill the criteria of 
Western membership (here defined as commitment to market economy and democracy), and are, thus, 
more suited with the “West-label” than without. 
18 Israel is included in Group II because of its geographical situation. 
19 In nominations submitted by more than one state party, region has been decided on the basis of the 
geographical group that the majority of the state parties represent. 
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Table 5.2.1 shows that the likelihood of having a nomination inscribed on the List 
increases with a factor of 1.157 if submitted by a Western country, compared to if 
submitted by a non-western country. In substantial terms this means that the odds of 
inscription are 1.157 higher for Western nominations than for others, or that Western 
nominations hold close to 12 per cent better chance of having a nomination inscribed 
than do non-Western nominations. The effect is, however, not significant.  This may be 
due to the small N of 328, but also due to inadequate operationalization of the region 
variable. Therefore, the next section conducts the same analysis, only with an extended 
operationalization of X1.  
5.2.2 The effect of political region on inscription 
Although the Committee shall be exempted from political influences, it is an institution 
made up by political entities. Therefore, the political dimension should be considered 
when defining criteria for membership of the West. Countries such as New Zealand and 
Australia are examples of countries that, due to their Western political orientation, 
justify membership to the West. The extended definition of the region-variable is based 
on two ideological and institutional criteria for membership to the West: commitment to 
democracy and market economy. These are the same criteria used for membership in 
the OECD, and are used in the research of Barma et al. (2009). The following analysis 
examines the effect of the political West on the likelihood for inscription. When 
including a political dimension into the analysis, the effect of being a BRIC member 
should also be tested. 
Table 5.3.1 Effect of the political West and of BRICs on likelihood of inscription 
 B (S.E.)b Significance Odds ratio 
Intercept b0  
Decision to inscribe 
nomination or not 
.824 .183 .000 2.279 
X1 The political West .211 .263 .421 1.235 
X2 BRIC .212 .396 .592 1.237 
N 328 
 
The independent variable, “Inscription” and X1, “the political West” hold the same values 
as in the previous analysis.  
X2 “BRIC” holds value 1=BRIC member and 0=non-BRIC member.  
Table 5.3.1 indicates that neither the politically operationalized region variable has a 
significant effect of likelihood for inscription. Moreover, there is hardly any change in 
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likelihood of inscription when region is operationalized politically, an increase of only 
.078. The most plausible explanation behind the weak change is the fact that the two 
categories of groups are largely overlapping. The results of a bivariate correlation 
analysis between geographical and political region show a Pearson’s correlation of .784 
(See appendix 1) giving support to this explanation. Thus, when defining region by 
political affiliation instead of geographical situation, there is still no statistically 
significant basis to claim that the West has a higher probability of having nominations 
inscribed that do the Rest. Albeit weak, the effect indicates a tendency that aligns with 
the assumption proposed initially.  
The effect of being a BRIC country, X2, has no stronger effect than being a Western 
country. In fact, the table shows close to identical effect on the dependent variable. A 
correlation analysis between the X1 and X2 shows a Pearson’s value of -.341. This 
excludes that the similar effect is due to high correlation between the variables 
(appendix 1). Neither effects are significant, providing no statistical support for the 
assumption that Western nominations, from 2002 – 2010, have a higher probability of 
inscriptions than others, i.e. that the Committee is subject to a Western bias. It should 
not be undervalued that the results indicate a tendency pointing towards an increased 
probability of inscription of nominations submitted by Western or BRIC countries. 
Neither should one infer from these non-findings that a Western bias is non-existent in 
the World Heritage Committee. The inscription process is multiplex, thus a Western bias 
may be present elsewhere in the process. For this reason, the next section looks for a 
Western bias in the evaluation phase, i.e. where the ABs assess whether or not a 
nomination qualifies for inscription.  
5.3 The West, the Rest and the Advisory Bodies 
The use of external expert bodies is not unique to the World Heritage Convention, but is 
a rather common practise within international organisations. Expert bodies are 
expected to facilitate the decision-making process by developing a consensual 
knowledge base on which proper and effective decisions may be made (Tora Skodvin, 
2000). Moreover, the establishment of expert bodies within international organisations 
has been a measure taken in order to equalise the alleged disproportional power 
distribution within UN organisations. The idea is that the expert bodies will provide 
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politically neutral knowledge and recommendations on which decision can be made. 
Although politically neutral, the expert bodies have also been subject to political dispute 
and critique from non-Western state parties (Joyeeta Gupta 1997)20 and the knowledge 
that they create have been subject to political debate.  
The world is divided into two civilisations that interact strongly, albeit in a one-
sided way. One civilisation is based on the growth of scientific knowledge, the other 
demonstrates a more or less passive acceptance of results generated by the first. 
(Salomon, 1995:9) 
Salomon’s observation gives reason to examine whether this is the case within the 
World Heritage Convention as well, and whether a Western bias exists within the 
Committee’s “knowledge managers”, i.e. the ABs. 
5.3.1 The process of evaluation 
Before the Committee meets to decide on inscription of nominations to the World 
Heritage List, the nominations undergo extensive evaluation by three external Advisory 
Bodies. These are the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the 
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Centre 
for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). After the 
evaluation process, the ABs submit their recommendation to the Committee, based on 
their scientific assessments of the value of the nominated property as well as the sites’ 
State of Conservation (SOC)21  
The Committee is by no means obliged to make decisions that align with the 
recommendations from the ABs, but one can assume that their recommendations 
influence the decisions of the Committee. If the ABs to a greater extent recommend 
inscription for nominations from the West than from other regions, it is possible that 
this explains the high number of Western nominations as shown in 5.1.  
 
 
                                                        
20 Gupta’s findings are discussed in section 7.1.3 
21 In order to limit the scope of this thesis, I have only included the ABs recommendations regarding 
inscription of sites, and not regarding sites’ SOC 
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The recommendations from the ABs may fall into the following five categories:  
I = inscription  
OK = inscription of the nomination to extend an already existing property  
R = referral 
D = deferral  
N = not inscription 
 
Recommendation to refer a property back to the state party entails that the state party 
should conduct minor modifications of the nomination dossier before it can be 
resubmitted to the Committee within less than one year. These modifications may be 
extension of information, modification of formulations etc. Recommendations of deferral 
are understood as a harder option than referral, as a deferred nomination must undergo 
substantial revision before it can be resubmitted to the Committee. Recommendations to 
defer are often a result of inadequately or insufficiently completed nomination dossiers 
as well as improper formulations of the site’s OUV. (Advisory Bodies’ background 
information document on referral and deferral of nominations 2010). Table 5.3 below 
presents the distribution of recommendations from the ABs between the (politically 
defined) regions22 
Table 5.3 regional distribution of recommendations submitted by Advisory 
Bodies 
 Political region  
The 
West 
Eastern/ 
Central 
Europe 
Latin-
America & 
Caribbean 
Asia 
Pacific 
Africa Arab 
States 
BRIC Total 
ABs’ 
recom
mend-
ation 
Inscription 48.9 46.3 34.6 38.0 44.4 60.0 42.8 152 
OK 16.8 4.8 15.3 14.0 2.8 6.6 16.6 42 
Extention         
Referral 6.8 17.0 3.8 6.0 11.1 10.0 2.3 28 
Deferral 17.9 24.3 26.9 34.0 30.5 13.3 28.5 22.8 
Not 
inscribe 
8.2 7.3 19.2 8.0 11.1 10.0 9.5 31 
Total  145 41 26 50 36 30 42 328 
Numbers show the percentage share of recommendations from the ABs for nominations submitted by 
countries categorised by political region from 2002 to 2010. 
  
                                                        
22 Because the analysis seeks to detect possible political bias in the Committee, including the political 
definition of the region over the geographical, is logical. 
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5.3.2 “Defer back to state party”  
The table shows that Eastern/Central Europe; Latin-America and the Caribbean; Asia 
Pacific and Africa have considerable higher shares of nominations recommended for 
deferral than nominations from the Western and Arab state group. This indicates a 
possible tendency of deferring nominations from these regions and suggests that a 
Western bias exists within the ABs. A binary logistic analysis tests the statistical 
significance of the assumption and whether the likelihood of having nominations 
recommended for deferral varies across region.    
Table 5.3.2 The effect of region on the likelihood for deferral 
 B S.E. Wald Significance Odds ratio 
Eastern and 
Central 
Europe  
.432 .433 .994 .319 1.540 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean  
.567 .502 1.276 .259 1.763 
Asia and the 
Pacific  
.965 .439 4.830 .028** 2.624 
Africa  .700 .422 2.757 .097* 2.014 
Arab states  -.351 .579 .367 .545 .704 
BRIC -.201 .453 .196 .658 .818 
Constant 
(the West) 
-1.521 .216 49.366 .000 .218 
N = 328 
**Significant on 5 per cent level 
* Significant on 10 per cent level 
 
The results of a binary logistic analysis.  
The independent variable “recommendation to defer” holds value 1= “deferral” and 0= “all 
other recommendations” 
All independent variables are recoded into dichotomous variables (see syntax file in 
Appendix 2). For all independent dummy variables, value 1 indicates the region they 
represent. Value 0 = every other region.  
 
Table 5.3.2 shows the effect of each region on the likelihood for having a nomination 
recommended for deferral, relative to the West. The analysis identifies that only Africa 
and Asia and the Pacific have significant effects on likelihood for deferral. In substantial 
terms, this indicates that the odds that the ABs will recommend to defer a nomination 
from these regions increases with a factor of 2.014 if submitted by an African country 
and of 2.624 if submitted by a country from Asia and the Pacific, than if submitted by a 
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Western country. The effect of Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean are weak and insignificant. Still, they indicate an interesting tendency 
directing towards a higher probability of deferral for these non-Western countries than 
for Western countries. 
The dichotomous BRIC variable is included here in order to isolate and examine the 
effect of BRIC countries on the likelihood of deferral. The table shows a weak negative 
effect, which indicates that the likelihood for deferral decreases with a factor of .818 if 
submitted by a BRIC country, than if submitted by a country from the West. A similar 
effect is detected for Arab nominations, as also these hold a smaller likelihood for having 
a nomination recommended for deferral than the West. Here, one should consider the 
fact that these regions submit relatively few nominations to the Committee, which may 
be the reason why these effects prove not to be significant. 
The high standard deviation values prove that even with a liberal level of freedom 
degrees, the effects are too weak to infer any conclusion. However, one may conclude 
that the analyses conducted hitherto have detected interesting tendencies directing 
towards a World Heritage Committee that does not seem to benefit nominations from 
the “Rest”.  
5.4 Politicisation of the Committee 
“The World Heritage Committee has, during the last 10-15 years, become increasingly 
politicised in its work” (Norway’s Report from UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee’s 
34th Session in Brasilia July 25- August 3, 2010:3) Not only does the Norwegian report 
from the 34th Committee Meeting express this impression, but other informal sources of 
information suggest that there is a widespread perception that the Committee is 
becoming more politicised. Observers of the Committee argue that politicisation 
becomes evident through increased lobbying activities among the state parties during 
the negotiations, and through increased deviation between the decisions of the 
Committee and recommendations from the ABs.  
Politicisation is here understood as state behaviour and activities undertaken in the 
Committee with the purpose of achieving other goals than those embedded in the 
Convention text (i.e. goals of preserving the World’s natural and cultural heritage). It is 
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difficult to measure to what extent states act in accordance with the Convention text, 
and moreover, to collect quantitative data indicating this. As recommendations from the 
ABs are supposedly apolitical and submitted with the sole aim of preserving the World’s 
Heritage, I assume that opposition towards these, and attempts to inscribe nominations 
that the ABs recommend to defer or refer, indicate politicisation of the Committee. 
Politicisation is thus operationalized as discrepancy between the recommendation from 
the ABs and the decision made by the Committee.23  
5.4.1 Analysing politicisation of the World Heritage Committee  
If the assumptions expressed in the reports and by committee-observers prove right, it 
opens up for the possibility that the BRICs utilise the Committee for other purposes than 
those embedded in the Convention, and that there may be other motivations than those 
associated with a Western bias behind their statement of increased culture cooperation.   
Table 5.4.1 The effect of time and BRIC on likelihood for alignment  
  B (S.E.)b Significance Odds ratio 
Intercept b0  
Alignment 
-1.405 .271 .000 .245 
X1 Time .106 .053 .046* 1.112 
X2 BRIC -.321 .401 .424 .726 
N = 328 
*Significant on 5 per cent level 
 
Dependent variable “Alignment” holds value 0=alignment between decision and 
recommendation, and 1=non-alignment.  
X1 “Time” holds the values 0=2001, 1=2002, 2=2003 etc.  
X2, “BRIC” holds value 0=not BRIC and 1=BRIC.  
 
Table 5.4.1 shows that there is a significant tendency towards a growing discrepancy 
between recommendations from ABs and Committee decisions over time.  The odds of 
non-alignment increase with a factor of 1.112 each year, meaning that the probability of 
non-alignment increases by nearly 12 per cent between each Committee meeting. Albeit 
weak, the effect is significant on a 5 per cent level. Calculating the predicted probability 
for dealignment in 2002, I find that the probability of alignment was 0.20, whereas it 
increased to 0.36 in 201024. This suggests that the Committee has close to doubled the 
                                                        
23 I criticise and revise this operationalization in Chapter 7 
24
 The equation for predicting probability is presented in Tufte (2000:29ff) 
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amount of decisions that do not align with the recommendations of the ABs during the 
last 9 years.  These effects give sufficient indications to assume that the observers of the 
Committee are right in their claims that the Committee is becoming more politicised.  
The effect of BRIC on likelihood for alignment is negative and indicates that the 
likelihood for non-alignment decreases with a factor of .726 if the decision concerns a 
nomination submitted by a BRIC country. The small N suggests that this effect may be 
influenced by the fact that the BRIC variable entails few unites. However, the effect of 
BRIC is far from significant. 
5.5 Conserving the established Western bias 
The fact that no proofs of a biased Committee were found in this analysis suggests that 
the system that was established in the post-World War II era maintains. Further relying 
on the assumption established in the introduction, that of a UN developed in accordance 
with Western interests, implies that the Western bias continues to exist in the World 
Heritage Committee. Thus, the non-findings of the quantitative analysis are not to be 
understood as the absence of a Western bias, but rather, as conservation of it. It is 
therefore plausible that the perception of a biased Committee is present amongst the 
delegations. To what extent this motivates BRIC cooperation, is subject to examination 
in the qualitative analysis.  
5.6 Conclusion and point of departure for the next 
step  
Although not statistically significant, the analyses conducted in this Chapter detected 
unambiguous tendencies that support the assumption introduced initially. The 
Committee may not make decisions that directly favour the West, but as emphasised in 
section 5.5, the lack of bias in the Committee suggest that the West preserves its 
dominance in the Committee. Another plausible motivation behind the BRICs’ statement, 
however, may be dissatisfaction with the operation and role of the ABs. As the analysis 
has shown, the ABs tend to recommend nominations submitted by countries from the 
Rest for deferral. Moreover, evidences of increased politicisation of the Committee 
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suggest that state parties utilise the Committee for other purposes than those embedded 
in the Convention.  
These key findings establish a solid point of departure for further analysis of why the 
BRICs articulate their commitment to cooperation within culture. The next Chapter 
takes on a qualitative approach as it examines to what extent BRIC cooperation 
manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee, and whether the motivations behind 
the BRICs’ (alleged) cooperation suggested here, find support in the qualitatively 
collected data. 
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6 Differences and Commonalities 
The prior analysis established a point of departure for examining BRIC cooperation in 
the World Heritage Committee. As no support was given to the first assumption, which 
suggested that BRIC cooperation is motivated by the wish to compensate for a Western 
bias, this part of the thesis sets out to examine how and to what extent BRIC cooperation 
manifests itself in the World Heritage Committee. It looks for other motivations behind 
their statement of increased culture cooperation than that suggested in Chapter 5. This 
Chapter further describes the process in which the qualitative data were gathered and 
presents the findings derived from it. This section does not take on an analytical 
approach, but provides only a descriptive presentation of the data and the process of 
gathering them.  
6.1 Conducting the interviews – method and 
objectives 
Having scheduled meetings with all informants, except representatives from one of the 
BRIC countries with whom I despite several efforts never got hold of, I left for Paris and 
to UNESCO’s Headquarters in Paris, France.  During one week, I conducted interviews 
with three BRIC-representatives and two politically neutral observers of the Committee. 
I interviewed other observer informants in Norway, and some by telephone. The 
interviews were conducted within a time frame varying between 30 minutes up to two 
hours.  
The interview guide was well prepared and the dictaphone was made ready for 
recording. However, the two devices proved not to be of particular assistance as the 
dialogues kept a more natural flow without the interview guide, and as few of the 
representatives let me record them. The overall objective was given by the research 
question; to identify to what extent, and why, BRIC cooperation is manifested in the 
World Heritage Committee. I also wanted to probe the results from the statistical 
analysis, and look for empirical evidence of a Western bias in the interviews. I did this by 
categorising the questions and their respective purposes into four sections or parts.  
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The first part of the interview was used as a “warm up exercise” building confidence and 
establishing a comfortable informant-interview relation, which is as an important aspect 
for eliciting valuable and reliable data. This was achieved by starting off with simple 
questions about the informant’s experience with World Heritage and his/her role in the 
delegation. Following that, we continued to the more demanding part identifying the 
political background and political interests of the delegation through question such as 
“What would you say are the main objectives of your country when attending the World 
Heritage Committee Meeting?” The purpose of the first part was, thus, to identify 
whether the Committee was used as a means to achieve national interests, or whether 
the politically neutral, expertise purpose of the Committee’s was upheld.  
The second part, where I asked questions about the delegations working methods, 
development of instructions and routines for preparations before the Meeting, was used 
to create a natural setting for the informant to mention eventual inter-state 
collaborative efforts, i.e. BRIC cooperation. I asked questions such as “are there any 
countries with which you keep closer contact with than others?” Hence part two was 
used to “test” whether collaborative efforts with BRIC were mentioned without me 
implying it first. 
The third part had a similar objective, but the main focus was directed towards the 
presence of a West-Rest cleavage and perception of a Western dominance and bias in 
the Committee. Here, questions such as “to what extent does the imbalanced World 
Heritage List affect your country’s work in the World Heritage Committee?” or “How 
does your country work to even out the imbalanced distribution of World Heritage 
sites?” were asked. Here, I expected answers such as “Promoting non-Western 
nomination” or “working against inscription of Western nominations”. 
The final and fourth part was designed to discuss the presence and, possibly, the 
structure and nature of BRIC cooperation in the Committee. After introducing the 
question by referring to BRIC’s joint statement, direct questions such as “to what extent 
does this (statement of commitment to cooperation on culture) manifest itself in the 
World Heritage Committee?” or “how (and why) is BRIC cooperation pursued in the 
World Heritage Committee.” 
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6.2 Detecting tendencies 
The following section presents the general tendencies and findings that the interviews 
detected and is subject to analysis in Chapter 7. For anonymity purposes, the 
representatives are only referred to as BRIC-representatives and identified by number. 
When I refer to general impressions, unless otherwise is specified, these are perceptions 
that all BRIC -representatives share. Information that is only representative of the 
observers is specifically reported on. To structure the broad insight that the interviews 
provided me, I have italicised key findings.  
6.2.1 Political interests and background; national development and 
international visibility 
On my question of the delegation’s main objective in the World Heritage Committee, all 
representatives’ immediate answers were “getting nominations inscribed”. Making sure 
that the Committee made adequate decisions for protecting the world’s cultural and 
natural heritage was also mentioned, but less emphasised.  Moreover, all delegations 
highlighted the increasing prestige, status and international recognition of the World 
Heritage emblem as something that their countries found important. In this regard, 
some countries more than others underscored the economic and social potential that the 
emblem encapsulates, making me understand that obtaining national development was 
another objective when meeting in the World Heritage committee;  
We have two or three main objectives. One is to have nominations approved. This is 
done for the people back home. (…) These nominations are prepared with serious 
preparation to consider culture for development, you know, to alleviate poverty. 
Actually, this is strategic thinking! (BRIC representative 3) 
As the quote explicitly states, there are certain national interests embedded in the 
delegation’s efforts in the World Heritage Committee. However, not only national 
development proved to be of importance for the BRIC countries, but also increased 
visibility was equally emphasised as an important objective. In fact, one delegation set 
visibility to be the most important motivation behind their work in the Committee.  
Another goal was to pursue diplomatic relations with other state parties. This was done 
by exchanging votes, not only for decisions regarding the nominations to the List, but 
also for decisions in organisations outside of the Committee and UNESCO.   
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6.2.2 Working methods and cooperation strategies 
When I asked how the BRIC countries work before and during the Committee it was 
obvious that they all work after instructions from their national government, and that 
the World Heritage Convention was something of high priority to the BRICs. Moreover, 
all of the BRIC representatives emphasised that much work was put into securing a good 
presentation of a nomination, and that persuading the Committee of their nomination’s 
OUV was an important feature of their work in the Committee. That the BRICs were 
particularly active in this regard, was stressed by some of the observers who argued that 
the BRICs were recognised by their tendency of “playing tough” in the negotiations.  
The purpose of the question posed in this category was to elicit information about 
collaborative efforts within the BRICs. None of the representatives mentioned anything 
about collaborative efforts between them in round of questions. Rather, all emphasised 
regional coordination and cooperation as working methods that prevails in their 
strategy.  All representatives pointed out that they were not subject to any overarching 
collaborative arrangement with any other countries, but that issue-based cooperation 
sometimes occurred. “We may cooperate with some countries on some issues, and 
maybe sometimes countries come together in order to get forward a nomination” (BRIC 
representative 2).  
Furthermore, one of the informants emphasised several times that “nothing comes for 
free” (BRIC-representative 1), underscoring that the delegation’s efforts were expected 
to be reciprocated by those receiving support. Thus, vote exchange and mutual support 
were also detected as one of their cooperation strategies.  
6.2.3 The Rest’s relation to the West  
The most evident and unambiguous finding derived from the interviews was the 
evidence of a political cleavage between the West and the Rest. This was more or less 
explicitly stated by all interviewees, but wrapped in diplomatic terms such as  “there is a 
general solidarity  within the developing countries and within developed countries” as 
several of the informants expressed. On my question on how the delegations perceived 
the fact that 50 per cent of the world’s Heritage Sites were situated in the West, all 
informants – observers as well as BRIC representatives – regarded this as problematic. 
47 
 
The cleavage between the developed countries and the developing countries (i.e. 
respectively the West and the Rest) was present on several organisational levels. 
The immediate topic that followed the question regarding the West’s dominance of sites 
on the List was the role of the Advisory Bodies. Throughout the interviews it became 
clear that the ABs were considered the main reason behind the imbalanced World 
Heritage List. They were also perceived as a potential source of bias if they were to 
influence the Committee decisions. Through the interviews I learned that the scepticism 
towards the AB’s influence on the Committee decisions stemmed from a more general 
imbalanced knowledge-structure. As the quotes from the informants above illustrate, 
the interviews detected unambiguous tendencies towards a lack of credibility and 
legitimacy of the ABs within the BRIC group, and a perception that the ABs favoured the 
West.  
UNESCO’s working language (English and French) was also something that all of the 
BRIC representatives pointed out as a challenge for the developing non-Anglophone and 
-Francophone countries when encountering the World Heritage bureaucracy, while at 
the same time favouring the West. This was also said to reflect a more general structure 
enforcing Western dominance and maybe even contributing to a Western bias in the 
decisions of the Committee. 
A third finding from the discussions based on the West-Rest relation, was challenges 
regarding the nomination dossiers. All BRIC representatives emphasised that the 
nomination format had developed into a complex process that necessitates extensive 
technical expertise that most developing countries are in deficit of. BRIC representative 
3 expressed: “Western Countries are better prepared and they have the technical 
expertise needed to prepare the nominations.” 
6.2.4 Evidence of BRIC cooperation 
None of the BRIC-country representatives mentioned the abbreviation during the 
interview. In fact, all representatives gave examples of political groupings and coalitions 
without including BRIC in these. Only at the end of the interview session, when I 
addressed the question directly, was the term used and elaborated. “The BRIC 
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cooperation is probably the most artificial political coalition in the world.” (BRIC 
representative 1) 
“A freak arrangement” was another description of the group when I brought up the topic 
(BRIC representative 1). BRIC representative 3 even needed some seconds to think of 
what the abbreviation meant before emphasising that the term was created by an 
American professor, and that its country didn’t really understand why they were put in 
one group together with three other countries with whom they shared so few 
commonalities.  
Although none of the BRIC representatives projected the BRIC group to be of vast 
significance, an interesting finding was the various descriptions of the role of the BRICs 
presented by the different countries. One of the delegation informants denied any form 
of cooperation or diplomatic ties with any specific country and did not support the 
assumption of BRIC cooperation in the Committee. Another delegate, however, had a 
somewhat different description, saying that the BRIC ambassadors to UNESCO had 
monthly meetings where they exchanged views, and that “yes, maybe there is a certain 
coordination of positions” (BRIC representative 1) Moreover, the same delegate 
informed me that its delegation’s ambassador had paid its second courtesy visit to 
another BRIC country after its inauguration in the UNESCO family. The same BRIC 
representative stated that “They have their own gatherings, and yes, sometimes on 
particular agenda items we have similar points of view” (BRIC representative 1).  
6.3 Diverging perceptions - bilateral or BRIClateral 
cooperation? 
The interviews give weak grounds to claim that BRIC cooperation is solidly manifested 
in the World Heritage Committee. Interestingly, the impression I got of BRIC cooperation 
from interviewing BRIC representatives almost systematically diverged from the 
impression derived from the observer interviews. While the former group rejected my 
assumption of BRIC cooperation, most of the observers reported instances of coinciding 
BRIC position, which could symbolise BRIC cooperation. This divide is further addressed 
in the subsequent analysis. In my analysis take it that one BRIC country’s action and 
sentiment is representative of the other BRICs. I am, however, well aware of the 
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possibility that incidents of coinciding BRIC positions may reflect bilateral agreements, 
and not “BRIClateral” coordination i.e., BRIC cooperation.   
In the next Chapter I discuss the key findings in light of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 7, I focus on the findings that I consider crucial for 
answering the research question.  The BRICs’ common interests and perceptions of the 
institutional framework of the Convention are key features in this regard. The findings 
identified through the interviews are summarised in the table below. 
Table 6.2 Findings from the Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
  
•1.1 Getting nominations inscribed 
•1.2 Ensure adequate decisions by the Commettee 
•1.3 Increase visibility 
•1.4 Pursue diplomatic relations 
1.Political 
background/interests 
•2.1 Regional cooperation 
•2.2 Issue-based cooperation 
•2. 3 Persuation of the Committee members 
2.Methods and 
cooperative efforts 
•  3.1 Advisory Bodies considered biased 
•3.2 Working language perseived problematic 
•3.3 Nomination dossier format requirements are considered to contribute to 
the Western domination 
3. West-Rest division  
•4.1. No BRIC cooperation  
•4.2  Cultural confidence  
•4.3  Dividing perceptions about the reality of BRIC cooperation 
4. BRIC cooperation 
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7 Incentives and political strategies 
Having established that the evidence of BRIC cooperation in the Committee is weak, this 
chapter sets out to discuss why this is. In light of the theoretical framework and in 
combination with the quantitative results, the analysis resolves around three main 
arguments. The first is that the BRICs share certain perceptions and interests, which 
indeed could serve as a common platform enabling BRIC coalition. Second argument is 
that BRIC cooperation manifests itself through issue-based cooperation, which indicates 
that cooperation is inconsistent and motivated by self-interest. The third argument is 
that their behaviour in the World Heritage Committee contributes to politicisation of the 
Committee. Finally, I propose that the divide between the West and the Rest, as found in 
this analysis, is due to dividing perceptions of what the Convention is and ought to be. 
7.1 The BRICs’ shared preferences and aversions  
In the following section I argue that the BRICs have common interests, aversions and 
perceptions of the World Heritage Convention. As their common attributes imply that 
BRIC coalition should form, I analyse their behaviour in light of the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 4.   
7.1.1 Shared discontent towards Western domination 
When I asked how the delegations regarded the fact that 50 per cent of the World’s 
Heritage Sites are situated in the West, the answer from one of the BRIC-representatives 
was: “We find that fully illogical, fully illogical. Of course, the West was much earlier and 
faster than us. They did their homework” (BRIC representative 2). All BRICs shared the 
impression that the West dominated in the Committee, and depicted this as something 
negative. Brazil demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the Western-defined Operational 
Guidelines (OG) during the 34th Committee meeting in Brasilia. In connection with a 
dispute concerning a state party’s lack of fulfilment of certain criteria embedded in the 
OG, Brazil suggested to amend the OG, rather than to encourage the state party to 
comply with them. This instance was also reflected in Norway’s Report from the 34th 
Session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting in Brasilia (2010:3) as particularly 
provocative:  
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The host country Brazil, argued that it was ok to make decisions that exceeded the 
framework of the Operational Guidelines. The representative also expressed that 
since the Committee is the highest decision-making organ, such decisions should be 
fully in place.  
According to the observers, the Brazilian suggestion was perceived as “trivialisation” of 
the OG and as lack of respect for the Convention’s institutional framework.  Seeing this 
instance in light of the assumption suggested in Chapter 5, that of BRIC cooperation as a 
reaction to Western dominance, opens up for interesting interpretations. In light of 
Ikenberry’s (1989) article on the power of American cultural hegemony, the instance 
may represent a general resentment towards Western hegemony and Western-defined 
practices in the organisation. Thus, it may be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the 
Western-defined system and even to dismantle the Western institutional framework of 
the organisation. If further relying on the conclusions of the quantitative analysis, which 
demonstrated that the Western bias continues to exist in the Committee, the 
interpretation seems plausible.  
One should, however, be careful in landing on this conclusion. First, the empirical data 
gathered through the qualitative interviews provided no evidence of direct attempts by 
the BRICs to undermine the position of the West in the World Heritage Committee. 
Roberts (2010), Skak (2011) and Glosny (2010) also argue along this line and stress that 
the BRICs strive to have their voices heard and to increase their political influence 
internationally, although not by overthrowing the existing world order. As Skak 
(2011:16) argues: “Yes, the BRICs are rising powers, but this does not automatically turn 
them into challengers.” Rather, Glosny holds that the BRICs seek to submit to the 
existing Western-defined order, and to obtain a political position and political influence 
that corresponds with their international economic position from the system’s inside. 
This argument finds support in the BRICs’ Joint Declaration where they explicitly call for 
a reform of the share of votes in the World Bank and the IMF (BRIC Joint declaration 
2010:2f). This demonstrates that they are open in their communiqué calling for reform 
of the share of votes in the World Bank and the IMF, and that they do not secretly wish 
to overthrow the world order.   
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7.1.2 Shared opposition against the role of the Advisory Bodies 
In the interviews, however, I detected perceptions that suggest otherwise. The 
unambiguous indications of a joint malcontent among the BRICs with the Western-
defined practices embedded in the OG, was specifically directed towards the ABs. Some 
informants claimed that there was a cleavage in the Committee, defined by the 
countries’ attitudes towards the ABs. The cleavage divided the Western member 
countries from the non-western member countries by their perception of the ABs role in 
decision making. The Western countries tended to dedicate much weight to the 
recommendations of the ABs when deciding upon inscription, whereas the non-Western 
countries, therein the BRICs, tended to downgrade the importance of ABs’ assessments.  
According to the informants, the dividing perception of the role of the ABs is inarguably 
present in other UN agencies as well. “The West dominates everywhere in the UN”, BRIC 
representative 3 expressed. Joyeeta Gupta (1997) supports this notion. Gupta detected a 
similar political divide between developed and developing countries during the 
negotiation of the Framework Convention of Climate Change (FCCC). Gupta argues that 
certain ideas and problem solving approaches are often considered irrelevant during 
negotiations and holds that the FCCC is a good example of a Convention that for those 
reasons only reflects the industrialized country perspective, and excludes the 
developing country perspective. Gupta argues that international negotiations are 
conducted in a way that promotes issue-based coalitions of like-minded states and 
which, for political efficiency reasons, avoids North-South controversies. She further 
claims that this approach to international negotiations is “justified by the ideology of 
political realism that the world is what it is, and one should focus on what is possible, 
rather than what should be achieved.” (Gupta 1997: preface x). Gupta’s observations 
suggest that a BRIC coalition could emerge as their shared opposition against the role of 
the ABs make them a group of “like-minded states”.  
Another reason behind the wish to downgrade the influence of the ABs’ may be the 
Western bias that is latent in the science that the ABs produce and represent. This 
notion was clearly expressed by one of the BRIC representatives: 
(…) if you think that you have one Advisory Body based in Paris and another one 
based in Switzerland, and one in Rome. Most of their staff comes from the West and 
their experts hold education from European universities. It is only natural that the 
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way they view reality is based on their cultural background and it is impossible not 
to have that influencing your assessment. Like the French word implies; “forcement” 
25 they will look at the reality from their perspective.(BRIC representative 1) 
The perception was widespread among the BRIC-representatives. That the ABs were 
subject to a Western bias was further expressed by BRIC representative 3 who 
expressed that “sometimes, a site’s Outstanding Universal Value lies in the eyes of the 
beholder”. The BRICs’ notion of a potential bias embedded in the ABs is supported by 
Ernst B. Haas who argues that “knowledge incorporates scientific notions relating to the 
social goal. Such notions are rarely free from ideological elements. Nor are they 
necessarily free from the self-interest of their proponents” (Haas 1980:368).  
 Where’s the coalition? 
Put into theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4, the BRICs’ shared perception of 
the role of the ABs implies that BRIC coalition chould occur. Stein’s theory of coalitions 
emerging from common aversions suggests that the BRICs’ shared aversion against the 
ABs induce coalition formation. Translated into Axelrod and De Swaan’s policy distance-
theory, the BRICs’ common political preference would be to make inscriptions despite 
the ABs’ recommendations. Also then, the policy distance-theory projects BRIC coalition. 
One may therefore question why coordinated BRIC efforts did not prove more solidly 
manifested in the Committee, as the coalition theories predict so.  
Looking towards the result of the quantitative analysis provides a plausible explanation. 
As table 5.3.2 showed, the BRICs’ nominations tended not to be recommended for 
deferral by the ABs the last decade. This suggests that the BRICs are not sufficiently 
negatively affected by the ABs’ function in the Committee for coalition formation to find 
place. Another explanation may be found in the argument presented above, that the 
BRICs do not wish to position themselves against the West (Roberts 2010; Skak 
2011:16; Glosny 2010). Given that the results of the quantitative analysis referred to 
above, were not statistically significant, one should be careful in landing on this 
conclusion.  
                                                        
25 Forcement; something that is necessary or inevitable.  
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Yet another explanation behind the mismatch between the empirical data and the 
projections of the coalition theories may be that my understanding of BRIC cooperation 
is too constricted. When interviewing the BRIC representatives, I looked for evidences of 
consistent BRIC cooperation. Within Buzan’s terminology, what I searched for was 
evidence of an external negotiation group, i.e., a group that exist outside of the 
negotiation forum and which is established on the basis of geographical, political or 
cultural commonalities. As findings from the interviews and the documents analysis 
suggest that the BRICs cooperate on certain issues, it gives reason to examine the 
presence of an issue-based BRIC coalition in the Committee. This proposal lines up with 
Gupta’s argument: that international negotiations are conducted in a way that promotes 
issue-based coalitions of like-minded states (see section 7.1.3). Therefore, if 
understanding BRIC cooperation as issue-based, the concept may gain broader support 
in the empirical data.  
7.2 Issue-based BRIC cooperation in the Danxia-
instance 
Little evidence proved that the BRICs utilise their common features to regularly and 
jointly pursue their shared interests. Observing inconsistent BRIC cooperation suggests 
that the group takes form as an ad hoc group, or if put in Buzan’s terminology, as a 
common interest group. In these groups, states collaborate with the aim of pursuing self-
interest and secure a particular policy attribute. In this section, I present and analyse an 
instance in which BRIC cooperation was evident. Form the analysis I suggests that the 
BRIC group serves as a policy instrument used whenever political clout is needed. The 
following section presents an instance which exemplifies my argument. 
The Danxia-instance, which took place during the World Heritage Committee’s 34th 
session in Brazil 2010, was a dispute that arose during the negotiation of the Chinese 
nomination of the Danxia region to the World Heritage List. The discussion circulated 
around the question of whether or not Chinese mining activity was within or outside of 
the buffer zone26 of the nominated World Heritage Site. The ABs recommended the 
                                                        
26 A buffer zone is an area that surrounds a World Heritage Site and ams to provide an additional layer of 
protection to a property 
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nomination for deferral due to their concerns about the activity. The Chinese delegation 
strongly opposed the ABs’ assessment and claimed that the mining activity was outside 
of the buffer zone. During this discussion Brazil – allegedly surprisingly – took the floor 
and strongly supported China. The session was described by the informants as very 
controversial. Moreover, the observers claimed that the discussion generated a clear 
division between the Western countries on the one side, supporting the ABs’ 
recommendation, and the non-western countries, with China and Brazil as strong 
opposing voices, on the other side. In the end, however, the site was listed. 
The Danxia-instance shows how the BRICs spontaneously aligned their positions and 
supported each other. Given that the opposition was directed towards the ABs – towards 
which all the BRICs share sentiments of resentment – the political dimension of this 
coalition proved present. The policy distance theories explain this instance. Translated 
into Axelrod and De Swaan’s terminology, their common political preference can be 
understood as to downgrade the role of the ABs. Put in A. Stein’s theoretical framework, 
the BRICs’ joint performance may have been motivated by their common aversions 
towards the role of the ABs, as suggested above. Viewed in the framework of Riker, one 
may have difficult in seeing what interest the other BRICs would have in winning the 
majority, i.e. getting the Chinese nomination inscribed on the List. Another implication 
contesting Riker’s theory is the presupposition of a fixed pot. The inscription of the 
Chinese nomination can difficultly be shared among the coalition members.  
If extending the understanding of Riker’s “fixed pot” to also entail intangible elements 
such as vote-trading, reciprocal support etc., the apolitical theory may be explanatory. 
“In terms of the dynamics within the Committee, It works a bit like ‘I vote for you, you 
vote for me’, even though it is not put in those terms, but that is what you feel in the end” 
(BRIC representative 1). As the BRIC representative’s statement shows, the “pot” may 
consist of a guaranteed reciprocal vote. The presence of reciprocal practices was further 
indicated by the same BRIC-representative who emphasised the diplomatic challenges 
that followed whenever a state party brought a nomination to the table, and asked for 
support. In such a case, the informant found it hard to refuse “because in the end, we are 
counting on them [their support] as well” (BRIC representative 1). With this 
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background, one may well assume that Brazil supported China in the Danxia-event as 
part of a ‘tit-for-tat’ agreement, which Brazil expected China to reciprocate.  
Inconsistency is strategy 
This instance is one of very few where BRIC cooperation was evident. The spontaneity of 
Brazil’s support to China, further questions to what extent this represented BRIC 
cooperation, and not just spontaneously aligning positions or bilateral coordination. 
Thus, the instance gives little reasons to claim that BRIC cooperation is solidly 
manifested in the Committee. Rather, it proposes that the BRICs’ behaviour fit into 
Buzan’s Common Interest Groups. These groups build coalitions in support for 
particular policy positions, which here may have been to diminish the influence of the 
ABs on Committee decisions (see above). That the BRICs qualify for this label, further 
feeds into the assumption that BRIC cooperation is not solidly manifested in the 
Committee, but rather that their cooperation is inconsistent and self-interest driven. 
Furthermore, it proposes that the BRICs use each other as a strategic instrument 
whenever political clout, guaranteed votes and mutual support is needed.  
The strategic features of the BRICs are further reinforced by recent inclusion of South 
Africa to the acronym. Given BRICs’ financial engagement in the African continent, South 
Africa may serve as a strategic partner securing the BRICs a “gateway” to the continent. 
For instance, China’s surging demand for raw materials has led to vast extension of 
China’s diplomacy network in, and engagement throughout, the African content (The 
Economist27 2011). Although South Africa is the continent’s biggest economy it is also 
the continent’s biggest laggard with regards to economic growth, compared to Angola 
which is Africa’s fastest growing economy, with an average annual growth of only 3.5 
per cent (The Economist 2011). Thus, the economic assets of South Africa alone, cannot 
be what makes the country merit membership to the BRICs.  
7.3 Ruling the world by creating it 
The coalition theories presuppose that the goal of coalition formation is coalition 
success, i.e. winning the majority of the decisions-making body. As emphasised in 
Chapter 4, section 4.2, coalitions may be equally, or more, concerned with the political 
                                                        
27
 Article author unknown  
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interests embedded in the negotiation process as with ensuring a certain outcome. The 
negotiation setting offers a unique opportunity to influence actors and their interests, 
through problem solving and problem identification (Barnett of Finnemore 2004:16f). 
These attributes may explain the BRICs’ behaviour in the Committee. 
In the interviews I found that the BRICs give high priority to increase international 
visibility (see table 6.1, point 1.3). Prior to the 34th Committee meeting, Brazil laid down 
vast efforts in order to be granted permission to host the meeting in 2010. This, together 
with the recent and planned international events within the BRIC countries further 
demonstrates this. Moreover, the fact that the most recent Joint BRIC Declaration (2011) 
devotes a whole paragraph to express their common support for these activities, 
suggests likewise. Their joint declaration reads:  
We express our confidence in the success of the 2011 Universiade in Shenzhen, the 
2013 Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Youth Olympic Games in Nanjing, the 2014 
Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games in Sochi, the FIFA 2014 World Cup in 
Brazil, the 2016 Olympic and Paralympics Games in Rio de Janeiro and the FIFA 
2018 World Cup in Russia. (BRICS summit 2011 Joint Declaration, 2011:5) 
Viewing this in light of Nye’s Soft Power theory offers interesting interpretations. 
Relying on Nye’s premises of the power of soft power, these events can be understood as 
attempts to enhance soft power assets. The BRICs’ statement of cooperation on culture 
can be interpreted likewise. The World Heritage Committee is an ideal arena for 
increasing international visibility and a showground for spreading national culture and 
prestige. For these reasons, the BRICs’ interest in obtaining international visibility may 
be a way of shaping the preferences of others and make them “want what they want” 
(Nye 1990:166). Further relying on Finnemore and Sikkink’s demonstration how norms 
develop and influence international organisations, one may understand the BRICs’ 
controversial behaviour as an attempt to influence how the “ought” becomes the “is” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:916). Seeing the World Heritage Committee as a 
showground for national culture and prestige, it suggest that the BRICs strive towards 
taking the role as norm-entrepreneurs, although in another manner than that suggested 
by Finnemore and Sikkink: through international visibility.  
Further emphasising Nye’s theory and the political dimension of negotiation process, the 
Danxia-event may be interpreted as a strategic manoeuvre aimed at enhancing the 
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BRICs’ soft power through visibility. Brazil and China’s controversial position may be 
understood as a provocative act aimed at marking their political position and clout in 
the Committee. This suggests that for Brazil, who could not enjoy any shares of the 
coalition success, i.e. winning the majority, the motivation was primarily to make a 
stance and achieve attention in the Committee, and to contest the norm of complying 
with the ABs’ recommendations. This perspective equally explains Brazil’s controversial 
proposal to amend the OGs during the 34th Committee meeting (as elaborated upon in 
section 7.1.2) as a political stunt to demonstrate its position.   
7.4 BRICs under process 
Staying within the analytical framework of the process analysis approach, one could 
assume that the BRICs’ suddenly coinciding positions in the Danxia-instance was a result 
of situational pressures, cognitive influences and personal relations, rather than an 
instance of coordinated and planned efforts. Moreover, as the process analysis approach 
treats negotiation and –outcomes as a “sequence of connected events”, it offers 
interesting explanations of the BRICs’ behaviour. Viewing the BRICs’ spontaneously 
aligning positions as one cooperation event, one could assume that this can process into 
a more solidly manifested BRIC coalition through future BRIC events. Alternatively, one 
can understand the BRICs’ behaviour in the Danxia-instance as a result of a “sequence of 
connected events” that was initiated elsewhere, in intergovernmental fora outside of 
UNESCO. This assumption does not require extensive argumentation, as the most recent 
BRIC summit declares: 
We reviewed the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the 
view that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that 
there is a great scope for closer cooperation among the BRICS. We are focused on 
the consolidation of BRICS cooperation and the further development of its own 
agenda. We are determined to translate our political vision into concrete actions 
and endorse the attached Action Plan, which will serve as the foundation for future 
cooperation (IV BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2001:6 par.27)  
The Action Plan proposes new areas to explore, within which they aim to “establish, at 
UNESCO, a ‘BRICS-UNESCO GROUP’, aiming at developing common strategies within the 
mandate of the Organization” (IV BRIC Summit – Joint Declaration 2001:9). This 
statement contests the assumption proposed above, that the BRICs fit into Buzan’s 
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common interest groups. Rather, it demonstrates that the BRIC(S) are becoming an 
external group. The statement clearly demonstrates that the BRICs conceive of 
themselves as a group that qualifies for Buzan’s external negotiation groups.  
The BRICS’ ambitions further demonstrate the validity of the process analysis approach. 
Its manner of treating multilateral negotiations as a process in which negotiation 
outcomes and -coalition occur, demonstrates that the planned BRIC UNESCO group is a 
result of a sequence of connected (BRIC-) events that started outside of UNESCO. That 
the interviews did not reflect this plan, may simply be because the action plan was under 
development within the BRICs’ respective government at the time of the interviews, and 
had not yet reached the delegations in Paris. 
7.5 Politicisation of the Committee 
This Convention is only a means to achieve the goal of development (BRIC 
representative 4) 
My findings suggest that the BRICs’ utilise the Committee for other purposes than those 
embedded in the Convention. Given that the results from the quantitative analysis 
suggested that the Committee is becoming more politicised, one may ask how the BRICS 
planned UNESCO group will feed into this process. Before assessing whether the 
planned BRICS group will contribute to politicisation, one should establish solid 
empirical grounds to conclude that this development has taken place. One should 
therefore be careful in drawing conclusions solely relying on the conclusion from 
Chapter 5.  Extending the operationalization of politicisation to also include other 
indicators gives more reliable inferences. In the following section I use other indicators 
and examine whether these support the assumption derived from the quantitative 
analysis. 
7.5.1 More debate and heavier representation 
Hours spent on debate in the Committee serves as indication of politicisation. Similarly, 
the number of delegation representatives indicates the political priority that the state 
parties give to the World Heritage Committee. If extending the operationalization of 
politicisation to also entail these indicators, one can see a weak, but no less a tendency 
towards a more political Committee since 2001. 
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Table 7.4.1 hours of debate28 
 
The 25th Committee session (25COM) was convened in 2001, the 26COM was held in 2002, the 
27COM in 2003, and so forth (The Statistical Analysis of Decision-Making by Statutory Organs for 
the Past 10 years (2001-2010), 2010:2). 
 
The chart shows the evolution of the number of hours of debate during the Committee 
sessions and the number of decisions adopted. The Chart indicates that the Committee 
has experienced a steady increase in hours spent on debate during the sessions. In 2001, 
the hours amounted to 39, whereas 62 hours were spent on debate in 2010 (Ibid.) It 
should be emphasised, however, that the increase in hours spent on debate, is 
influenced by an increase in number of decisions adopted by the Committee29. Thus, the 
development does not solely reflect politicisation. Looking at the number of participants 
from each of the Committee members’ delegations, however, further complements the 
operationalization.  
 
                                                        
28 The exact figures for the BRICs was not accessible, thus the figures presented here, indicate the 
tendency on an aggregate level where all state parties are included.  
 
29 These counted 106 in 2001 and reached almost 300 (292) in 2008 (The Statistical Analysis of Decision-
Making by Statutory Organs for the Past 10 years (2001-2010), 2010:3)29. 
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Table 7.4.2 delegation representatives present in the Committee meetings 
Average number of participants registered for each Committee member delegation (The Statistical 
Analysis of Decision-Making by Statutory Organs for the Past 10 years (2001-2010), 2010:12).  
Table 7.4.2 shows the average number of participants registered for each Committee 
member delegation. In 2001, each Committee-member delegation was represented by 
an average of 5.1 participants, whereas the number reached 7.7 in 2009 (Ibid.:11). One 
could thus assume that the delegations to an increasing extent prioritise the Committee 
and value strong representation in the Committee meetings. The numbers presented 
here show a weak, but nevertheless, a tendency that supports the assumption of an 
increasingly politicised Committee. The same is reflected in the Swedish report from the 
Committee meeting in 2010, which states that the agenda for the 34th meeting was the 
most comprehensive in the history of the Convention, “leading to long discussions and 
voting in some cases” (Swedish Report from the World Heritage Committee Meeting in 
Brasilia 2010:1) These figures, combined with the findings from this analysis gives solid 
empirical foundation to claim that the Committee, the last decade, has become 
increasingly politicised. The next section sets out to examine how the BRICs have 
contributed to this development. 
7.6 The BRICs in politicisation of the Committee 
The quantitative analysis showed that the BRICs had a negative effect on politicisation. 
As the effect was statistically insignificant, one cannot exclude the possibility that he 
BRICs contribute to this development when acting in the Committee. The interviews 
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generated an overall impression that the BRICs acted with other intentions than 
preserving the world’s natural and cultural heritage. The assumption finds support in 
the Norwegian Report from the 34th Committee Meeting in Brasilia, 2010, which 
explicitly claims that the Committee, during the last 10-15 years has become more 
political. (Norway’s Report from the 34th Session of the World Heritage Committee 
Meeting in Brasilia 2010:3). Moreover, the BRIC countries were highlighted as actors 
contributing to this: 
Brazil, China and Egypt were particularly active in their work in the Committee. (…) 
China was perceived as particularly political in their work. The country established 
a practice of putting pressure on the Committee Members in order to get support 
for their nominations to the List. (…) This [practice] was also pertinent for 
nominations that the Advisory Bodies had recommended to defer or refer back to 
the state party. Several delegations informally expressed that they found the 
situation uncomfortable. (…)Politicisation became evident by the fact that the 
Committee continuously inscribed nominations that were not recommended for 
inscription. (Norway’s Report from the 34th Session of the World Heritage 
Committee Meeting in Brasilia 2010:3) 
The same impression was reinforced by an observer who claimed that BRIC cooperation 
became evident by incidents of coinciding interests characterised by a willingness to set 
aside previous rules in favour of national interests. Moreover, the person described that 
the BRICs held high level of interest and participation in issues that were of direct 
national concern, whereas the level of engagement was low in issues of collective 
interest and which did not concern the BRICs directly (Observer 1). This fits well into 
Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of the “Logic of Collective Action”, which briefly holds that 
actors will never voluntarily act to achieve a collective good. Even if all of the individuals 
in a group would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common objective, they 
will still not act to achieve that common objective unless some coercion measure or 
specific incentives are present (Olson 1965:2). Applying this to the BRIC case, it suggests 
that the BRICs act collectively whenever there is a possibility of achieving common 
goods. Their collective good in the World Heritage Committee would be to undermine 
the role of the ABs, whereas their individual good would be to inscribe their respective 
nominated site. Olson’s logic supports the proposal in section 7.2, i.e. that the BRICs’ are 
self interest-driven and, moreover, that they contribute to politicisation if the 
Committee. 
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7.6.1 Other political groups 
The BRIC countries’ involvement in various cooperation groups further enforces the 
presumption that the BRICs act a strategic group that contributes to politicisation. If 
translating what Alter and Meunier (2009) call forum-shopping into “group shopping”, it 
adds to the understanding of the BRICs’ behaviour. In “forum-shopping” an actor will 
select the international arena where he/she believes that they are best able to promote 
specific policy preferences, with the goal of eliciting a decision that favours their 
interest. In “group-shopping”, one could assume that the BRIC members ally with the 
group that they believe will provide best support and enhance the chances of achieving a 
specific outcome. This line of thought aligns with Riker’s apolitical coalition theory, and 
the logic that proposes that actors enter into a coalition with the aim of winning the 
majority, or of achieving a specific outcome, and not on the basis of ideological attraction 
or political preferences. Multi-group involvement is not unique to the BRICs, however, 
and many countries participate in various groups based on ideological, geographical or 
political affiliation. Thus, the “group-shopping” alone is not sufficient to claim that the 
BRIC group contributes to politicisation of the Committee. Nonetheless, it contributes to 
the assumption that the BRICs act with other purposes than what is indicated in 
Convention, and feed into the politicisation development of the Committee.  
7.6.2 Using the Committee as a political arena 
BRIC representative 1 was explicit in the description of how his/her country’s position 
in the World Heritage Committee enabled the delegation to pursue diplomatic relations 
that exceeded the Committee’s mandate. One example was an instance where another 
non-Western nomination was recommended for deferral by the ABs. Here, the 
representative’s delegation again expressed its strong opposition towards the ABs’ 
assessments and claimed the nomination to be inscribed. On my question of why the 
delegation chose to provide its support to the other state party, the answer was simply 
that the informant’s national government recently had established an embassy in the 
country that had submitted the nomination. This demonstrates that BRIC countries use 
the Committee as a political arena to pursue diplomatic relations that find place outside 
of its Committee. Another example includes mutual support between BRIC members 
where BRIC 1 supported BRIC 2’s nomination in exchange for support for BRIC 1’s 
candidature for representation in an external UN organisation. That such vote trading 
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and issue-linkage of this scale found place in the Committee, is something that the 
observers described as controversial and new. Other observers emphasised that the 
BRIC countries, together with certain African state parties, were the most “aggressive” 
actors in this regard. 
7.7 Diverging perceptions of the Convention 
Another explanation behind the BRICs’ “political” behaviour in the World Heritage 
Committee may be dividing perceptions of what the World Heritage Convention is and 
ought to be. For developing countries that are faced with severe challenges through war, 
social issues and poor development levels, preserving the world’s cultural and natural 
heritage is not of primary concern. Put in Ronald Inglehart’s (1980) terms, not all state 
parties have reached the level where post-material values prevail. For developing 
countries, whose costs of submitting a nomination are significantly higher than for 
developed countries, having a nomination deferred or referred back by Western experts 
may well be perceived as forlorn efforts and even as a condescending signal. 
This further explains the West Rest division that proved present in the Committee and 
elsewhere in the UN family, as indicated through Gupta’s (1997) research. Moreover, 
this suggests that the BRICs’ opposition against the ABs stems from for diverging 
perceptions of the function of the ABs. BRIC-representative 3 gave me the impression 
that the ABs were little more that obstacles to inscription and that had to be overcome.  
Among the BRICs, the Convention was generally perceived as a means of economic and 
social development.  Moreover, the role of the Committee was perceived as to inscribe 
nominations, even if the nominated properties “sometimes do not qualify for World 
Heritage status” as BRIC representative 1 expressed. That the Convention should favour 
the developing countries was another shared attitude among the BRIC representatives. 
Allegedly, for the Western countries, the purpose of the Convention is to preserve the 
World’s cultural and natural heritage, whereas for the BRICs – as representatives of the 
developing world – “this Convention is only a means to achieve the goal of development” 
as BRIC representative 3 unmistakably expressed.  
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7.8 Summary 
This chapter has argued that the BRIC countries share perceptions and interests that 
would imply BRIC coalition to emerge. I found little evidence of a consistent BRIC 
cooperation, similar to Buzan’s external negotiation groups. If understanding BRIC 
cooperation as issue-based, I found evidence of BRIC cooperation during the Danxia-
instance that took place in 2010. This instance demonstrated spontaneous and mutual 
BRIC support, which suggest that the cooperation is strategic and self-interest driven. 
Put into Buzan’s categories, the BRICs behaviour qualify as common interest groups. In 
the analysis, I have stressed the political potential embedded in the negotiation process 
and suggested that the BRICs seek to gain political clout through increasing visibility. 
Moreover, that negotiation is a process which influence state behaviour has found 
support in the recent BRIC(S) announcement of establishing a BRICS UNESCO group. In 
light of this statement, I have demonstrated that there are reasons to believe that the 
BRICS will contribute politicisation of the Committee. Finally, I proposed that the BRICs’ 
political behaviour is due to varying perceptions of the role and purpose of the World 
Heritage Convention.  
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8 Conclusion 
From the closing outlook on this thesis, a number of findings stand out as humble 
contributions to the story about the BRICs, as well as to the broadened understanding of 
intergovernmental cooperation and coalition formation. From the data generated in this 
research, the answer to my initial question of how and to what extent BRIC cooperation 
is manifested in the World Heritage Committee can be articulated in two adjectives: 
inconsistent and weak. In this closing Chapter I will briefly summarise the key insights 
that have led to this suggestion.  
After having provided the brief introduction to the mandate and organisational 
structure of the World Heritage Convention in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 discussed the 
methodological research design developed for the thesis. Here I presented and justified 
the methodological choices made. I developed a multi-strategic research design that I 
utilised for gathering and applying the data that eventually brings me to this conclusion.  
The reliability and validity of the data, as well as the inferences drawn from it, have 
gained significant confidence by triangulating between quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Despite the methodological strength of this thesis, it still faces the reliability 
challenges that follow the use of qualitative interviews. Not mentioning the BRICs in the 
beginning of the interviews, was one way of reducing the risk of bias. Another was to 
interview politically neutral observers. The fact that the interviews did not pick up the 
planned establishment of a “UNESCO BRIC GROUP” questions the validity and reliability 
of the data. The most plausible explanation behind this, is that none of the interviewees 
were on ambassador level and may not have had full insight into the processes within 
their home governments. Moreover, the analysis suffers under the lack of access to the 
minutes from the Committee, which would have provided valuable information, 
strengthening the confidence of the findings.  
Among the weaknesses of the statistical analysis, the small N stands out as a threat 
towards reliability. By expanding the scope of units to include more nominations, 
statistically significant results might have been found. Moreover, by including more 
units might have derived significant results. Ideally, I could also have included a BRIC 
variable to control for changes on the dependent variable before and after the 
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establishment of the BRICs. I refrained from doing this, as there were few units on the 
BRIC variable, because the BRICs did not submit many nominations after 2009 (when 
BRICs were formalised into cooperation). Therefore, bringing in a BRIC control variable 
would not have provided much information.  
Chapter 4 argued for the theoretical expectations of when and how coalitions occur. 
Some of these suggested that coalitions occur with the aim of winning the majority of a 
decision-making body i.e. to secure a particular negotiation outcome. Coalition theories 
provided different perspectives of coalition success and what makes actors join 
coalitions. They suggested that the BRICs would strive to join a coalition whenever they 
expected that it would lead to winning the majority, and/or if the coalition’s expected 
policy were proximate to their own political preferences.  The theoretical perspectives 
of Joseph Nye(1990) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggested that the negotiation 
process embedded political interests, and explained BRIC behaviour as an attempt to 
enhance soft power assets. Negotiation theory supported this proposal. This treated 
negotiations as a process and emphasise the influence that the negotiation context may 
have on state behaviour.  Moreover, the inclusion of Buzan’s negotiation groups aided to 
evaluate the political depth of the cooperation. How the findings have matched the 
theories is elaborated upon subsequently.  
The statistical analyses conducted in Chapter 5 examined statistically, the evidence of a 
Western bias in the World Heritage Committee, and determined the course of the 
qualitative analysis. The analyses demonstrated that a Western bias exists through the 
continued dominance of the West on representation on the World Heritage List. 
Moreover, the bias proved present within the Convention’s ABs who tended to defer 
non-Western nominations more frequently than Western nominations. Nominations 
from the BRICs, however, did not have a significantly higher likelihood for having a 
nomination recommended for deferral than did Western nomination. But as this effect 
was not statistically significant, I did not exclude the possibility that the BRICs were 
motivated by biased ABs. This, together with the statistical evidence of an increasingly 
politicised Committee constituted the point of departure for the qualitative research and 
the semi-structured interviews.  
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Chapter 6 outlined the process of collecting the qualitative data and descriptively 
presented the findings identified through the interviews. The findings provided weak 
evidence of BRIC cooperation in the World Heritage Committee, but found that they 
share certain attributes, such as political interests and perceptions of the Convention 
and its framework. “A freak arrangement” was the label that BRIC representative 1 put 
on the cooperation. The label proved surprisingly descriptive of the groups’ behaviour in 
the Committee, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. That is, if translating 
“freaky” into “inconsistent” in academic terms.  
Chapter 7 discussed the key findings detected in Chapter 6 in light of the theoretical 
proposals of Chapter 4. Empirically, the BRICs proved to be a “freak arrangement” as 
they shared astonishingly many attributes despite their vast differences in all aspects. 
Key attributes in this regards were their negative perception of the dominance of the 
West in the Committee and of the role of the ABs. That these sentiments possibly 
motivate BRIC behaviour was exemplified through the Danxia-instance, where BRIC 
cooperation was evident, although weak. From the theoretical perspective, what makes 
the BRICs into “freaks” was their lack of planned and coordinated efforts (i.e. coalition), 
despite their common features. The coalition theories predicted that the BRIC would act 
in coalition, as their common objective of diminishing the role of the ABs would 
incentivise coalition formation between them. Here, I detected a weak spot of the 
coalition theories. They do not distinguish between spontaneously arising coalitions 
connected with a specific issue, and coalitions that are consistent over time. One can 
therefore not asses from these theories, the depth or reality of the BRIC cooperation.  
Buzan’s categorisation of negotiation groups aided me in evaluating the extent to which 
BRIC cooperation manifests itself in the Committee, and suggested that they qualify as 
common interest group. Although the empirical data of this study suggest that BRIC 
cooperation is self-interest driven and inconsistent, one cannot exclude from the data 
collected here that the BRICs qualify for the external group label. Although their most 
recent joint statement suggests so, their spontaneous and unpredictable joint 
performance in the Committee, holds that the BRICs are ad hoc-groups during the 
negotiation. Moreover, that they act jointly whenever they expect that they by doing so, 
can achieve a common objective. 
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Including the process analysis approach to negotiation theory, and combining this with 
Nye’s and Finnemore and Sikkink’s perspective of political power assets, proved 
valuable theoretical contributions. As several incidents suggested that the BRICs were 
motivated by features of the negotiation process and not solely negotiation outcomes, 
these theories gave explanations to the BRICs’ controversial behaviour. It suggested that 
negotiations are results of a sequence of connected events. Because BRIC cooperation 
proved not to be solidly manifested in the Committee, this analysis suggests that the 
inconsistent cooperative efforts be a beginning sequence that may eventually leads to 
more solidly – and externally – manifested BRIC cooperation. This prediction seems 
startlingly right, as the recently closed IV BRIC Summit proposed to establish a BRIC 
UNESCO group.  
I found unambiguous indications that the Committee is becoming more political. 
Whether or not the BRICs contribute to this development is less clear. The BRICs’ active 
involvement in various groups, and their pursuit of diplomatic relations outside of the 
Convention’s mandate, proposes that the planned BRICS UNESCO group will contribute 
to politicisation of the Committee. It suggests that they be motivated by political 
purposes exceeding those embedded in the Convention. 
Amongst my contributions to the field coalition formation generally and BRIC 
cooperation specifically, the unmistakable aversion towards the ABs stand out as my 
main finding from this thesis. The finding adds to the already proposed assumption by 
Joyeeta Gupta (1997), and may be useful contributions to understanding the dynamics 
within international organisations which operate with expert bodies. A second main 
finding that I detected in this thesis,  is the scientific value of triangulating between 
methods. Combining statistical analysis, document analysis and qualitative interviews 
have enabled me to land on acceptably reliable and valid conclusions. The strength of 
the quantitative analysis in detecting tendencies, established a valuable point of 
departure enabling me to identify correlations that otherwise might have been 
overlooked, such as the reasons behind the West-Rest divide, caused by diverging 
perceptions of the role of the ABs. The power of method triangulation therefore stands 
out as an important finding, contributing to development of future research designs 
within the political science field. 
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The BRICS’ recent proposal to establish a BRIC UNESCO group demonstrates the 
relevance of my thesis. Now that the small S has gone capital and South Africa has joined 
the club, there are reasons to believe that the club of rising powers will take on an 
influential position in the international society in the years to come. The need for 
research and knowledge about this unlikely cooperation will possibly be accordingly. My 
research has been a minor contribution in this regard. Although my findings suggest that 
the BRICs are dissatisfied with some of the practices within the organisation, one cannot 
infer from my findings that the BRICs wish to retaliate for Western world dominance. 
The BRICS’ historic good diplomatic relations to the US and the West further suggests 
this. However, there are many reasons to follow the BRICS story, but few reasons to 
believe that the “New Kids on the Block” are trying to get rid of the old block.  
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Appendix 1 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation matrix between Decision to inscribe/not inscribe and geographical 
and political region 
Correlations 
 PolRegDik GeoRegDik 
PolRegDik Pearson Correlation 1 .784** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 328 327 
GeoRegDik Pearson Correlation .784** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 327 327 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix between the variables BRIC and the Political West 
Correlations 
 nyBRIC PolRegDik 
nyBRIC Pearson Correlation 1 -.341** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 328 328 
PolRegDik Pearson Correlation -.341** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 328 328 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 2 – syntax files from SPSS 
Table 5.2.1 Effect of the geographical West on likelihood of inscription 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DecDik 
  /METHOD=ENTER GeoRegDik  
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
Table 5.3.1 Effect of the political West and of BRICs on likelihood of inscription 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DecDik 
  /METHOD=ENTER PolRegDik nyBRIC  
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
Table 5.3.2 The effect of region on the likelihood of having a nomination 
recommended for deferral 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES ABDeferralDik 
  /METHOD=ENTER PolRegWest PolRegECEur PolRegLaAmCarribean PolRegAsiaPac 
PolRegAfrica PolRegArab nyBRIC 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
Table 5.4.1 The effect of time and BRIC on likelihood for alignment between 
decisions by the Committee and recommendations from the Advisory Bodies 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES DikAlignment 
  /METHOD=ENTER nyTime nyBRIC  
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
Dichotomisation of independent the independent variables for analysis in table 
5.4.1 
RECODE PolRegSnudd (0=1) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) INTO PolRegWest. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegWest 'PolRegWest'. 
EXECUTE. 
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RECODE PolRegSnudd (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (1=1) (0=0) INTO PolRegECEur. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegECEur 'PolRegEastCentralEurope'. 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE PolRegSnudd (3=0) (4=0) (5=0) (0=0) (2=1) (1=0) INTO 
PolRegLaAmCarribean. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegLaAmCarribean 'PolRegLaAmCarribean'. 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE PolRegSnudd (4=0) (5=0) (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=1) INTO PolRegAsiaPac. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegAsiaPac 'PolRegAsiaPacific'. 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE PolRegSnudd (5=0) (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=1) INTO PolRegAfrica. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegAfrica 'PolRegAfrica'. 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE PolRegSnudd (0=0) (1=0) (2=0) (3=0) (4=0) (5=1) INTO PolRegArab. 
VARIABLE LABELS  PolRegArab 'PolRegArab'. 
EXECUTE. 
 
